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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A
REVIEW OF THE GOVERNING
STANDARDS OF ENFORCEABILITY
AFTER DESANTIS V. WACKENHUT
CORP. AND THE LEGISLATIVE




USINESS employers commonly place restraints, often unreasonably,
on the employee's ability to pursue other employment upon termina-
tion of current employment.' Indeed, such restraints upon postem-
ployment competition form a standard part of many modem-day
employment contracts.2 Generally, employers require their employees to
sign noncompetition covenants in which employees agree to not compete
with their employers within a designated geographical area for a certain time
period after termination of their employment.3 The fact that courts have
adjudicated the enforceability of contractual restraints of trade in the post-
employment context for more than five hundred years indicates the serious
problems created by such agreements.4
From an employer's perspective, an employee's competitive activity can
result in significant harm to the business, such as loss of clientele, customer
goodwill, and confidential information. 5 The employee's view is that enforc-
ing the noncompetition covenant will result in great economic hardship for
the employee because of an inability to engage in similar work he or she is
1. See Hutter, Drafting Enforceable Employee Non-Competition Agreements to Protect
Confidential Business Information: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case Law, 45 ALB. L.
REv. 311, 312 (1981).
2. See Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild'" Antitrust Treatment of Postemploy-
ment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 621, 622-23 (1977). Although conclusive
empirical data is lacking, this comment discusses a survey indicating that employers across the
American states utilize noncompetition covenants extensively. Id.
3. See Blake, Employee Agreement Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627 (1960).
4. Id. at 631-32.
5. Id. at 627. "[Employers regard] postemployment restraints ... as perhaps the only
effective method of preventing unscrupulous competitors or employees from appropriating val-
uable trade information and customer relationships for their own benefit." Id.
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otherwise qualified to do.6 Additionally, these restraints unduly limit com-
petition by deterring employers in competing businesses who fear the legal
consequences of hiring employees bound by noncompetition covenants.7
Texas courts have never favored covenants suppressing competition.8
Consequently, in balancing the competing interests between the employer
and the employee, Texas courts strictly scrutinize noncompetition covenants
in determining their validity.9 Two recent opinions of the Texas Supreme
Court have greatly restricted the employer's ability to enforce noncompeti-
tion covenants. 10 Furthermore, the Texas Legislature's recent adoption of
sections 15.50 and 15.51 to the Texas Business and Commerce Code alters
the common law analysis dealing with the enforceability of covenants not to
compete. Specifically, assuming the employer has a legitimate business in-
terest worthy of protection, the legislation mandates that Texas courts mod-
ify covenants not to compete incorporating unreasonable restraints as to
time duration, geographical area, and scope of activity so as to render them
enforceable. 1
Since the landmark decision of Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc.,12 the Texas
Supreme Court, in at least four instances, has flatly refused to modify post-
employment noncompetition covenants that it deemed unenforceable.13 The
6. Id. at 627.
7. Id.
8. See Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1987, no writ). See also Carpenter v. Southern Properties, Inc., 299 S.W. 440, 443 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1927, writ ref'd) (negative covenants are enforceable if the burden of proof is
met). In Carpenter the court observed that:
[c]ourts, however, do not look upon such contracts with favor and, when such a
covenant is attempted to be enforced, require that the employer establish the
fact that such negative covenant was necessary ... and that the prohibition is
reasonable, both in its duration of time and in the territory over which it
operates.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681-82 (Tex. 1990). In the De-
Santis opinion, the court unequivocally stated that the benefits to the promisee must be bal-
anced against the burdens to the promisor and the public prior to the enforcement of
noncompetition covenants. Id. at 682. The court further observed:
[S]uch... agreement[s] may... accomplish the salutary purpose of encour-
aging an employer to share confidential, proprietary information with an em-
ployee in furtherance of their common purpose, but must not also take unfair
advantage of the disparity of bargaining power between them or too severely
impair the employee's personal freedom and economic mobility.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comments c, g (1981)).
10. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685; Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667,
670 (Tex. 1990).
11. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-.51 (Vernon Supp. 1991); see infra notes
167-75 and accompanying text.
12. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
13. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616, 620 (July 13, 1988),
withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (court refused to reform overly broad covenant absent
the employer's showing of protectable interest); Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 31 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 626, 626 (July 13, 1988), withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (noncompetition
covenant invalidated since not supported by independent valuable consideration and not ancil-
lary to otherwise enforceable agreement); Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673, 674
(Tex. 1987) (noncompetition covenants restraining rights of hairstylists to compete wholly un-
enforceable because it is a common calling); Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 172 (no presumption exists
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courts' unwillingness to reform unreasonable noncompetition covenants into
more narrowly drawn and reasonable restrictions reflects the judiciary's be-
lief in the importance of the employer's burden to establish that his or her
business interest is legitimate and therefore entitled to protection by enforce-
ment of a noncompetition covenant. 14 An examination of relevant Texas
case law demonstrates a dramatic shift in the approaches of Texas courts in
determining the enforceability of noncompetition covenants.
This Comment begins with a review of the historical trends and general
principles reflected in Texas case law concerning the validity of postemploy-
ment noncompetition covenants. Next, this Comment analyzes DeSantis v.
Wackenhut Corp.,15 a recent supreme court decision outlining the most cur-
rent developments concerning the enforceability of covenants not to com-
pete. Next, this Comment reviews the potential impact that the 1989 Texas
legislative amendments will have on the enforceability of noncompetition re-
strictive covenants, focusing specifically on whether the amendment will ef-
fectively abolish the previous common calling standard adopted by the
supreme court' 6 for determining the enforceability of a covenant not to com-
pete. Finally, this Comment analyzes the implications of a return to judicial
reformation in the enforcement of noncompetition agreements.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS IN TEXAS
A. Public Policy Disfavors Noncompetition Covenants
The common law of contracts does not generally enforce contracts that
are in restraint of trade. ' 7 Unquestionably, most restraints of trade, includ-
favoring the validity of noncompetition covenants despite courts' prior reformation of unrea-
sonable covenants).
14. But see Wabash Life Ins. Co. v. Garner, 732 F. Supp. 692, 693 (N.D. Tex. 1989). In
this case the plaintiff contended that § 15.50 substantially altered the previous common law
cause of action so that the analysis now focused exclusively on whether the covenant was
necessary to protect the employer's business interest. Id. The Wabash court, however, em-
phatically rejected this argument, instead citing language from three Texas Supreme Court
cases that essentially track the language found in the statute. Id.; see Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 170-
71; Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v.
Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960).
15. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
16. See Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 172. In the Hill case the court adopted a new test, the com-
mon calling standard, for determining enforceability of covenants not to compete in Texas.
The standard essentially provides that "covenants not to compete which are primarily
designed to limit competition or restrain the right to engage in a common calling are not
enforceable." Id. at 172.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-188 (1981); 14 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1633-1635 (3d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1990). Some
states prohibit all or most forms of restrictive covenants by statute. The following states are
among those with statutes that prohibit or limit such postemployment covenants: Alabama:
ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1975); California: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964); Colo-
rado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (1973) (the statute, however, permits employee noncompe-
tition agreements where the employer wishes to recover the costs of educating or training an
employee or when the employee is an executive or staff member of an executive); Louisiana:
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (West 1964) (a maximum two-year restriction is permitted,
however, if the employer has trained or advertised for the employee); Michigan: MICH. COMP.
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ing unreasonable covenants not to compete, contravene public policy. 1 Ac-
cordingly, Texas courts have repeatedly asserted that they strongly disfavor
covenants not to compete.19 Because noncompetition covenants create re-
straints of trade, courts have consistently held them to be unenforceable on
public policy grounds unless the terms of the covenant are reasonable.20 In
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,21 the most recent pronouncement of these
principles, the Texas Supreme Court declared that the state's policy of free-
dom of movement in the job market benefitted both the state and the individ-
ual. 22 Moreover, covenants that cause hardships by interfering with a
person's means of livelihood are generally at odds with the strong public
policy favoring freedom of mobility for employees. 23
B. Two Types of Reasonable Noncompetition Covenants
Texas courts encounter two general varieties of covenants not to com-
pete:24 covenants specifying that the seller of a business will not compete
with the buyer, 25 and covenants providing that an employee, after his or her
termination, will not compete with the former employer. 26 Both types of
covenants typically provide temporal, geographical, and scope of activity
LAWS § 445.761 (1967); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1960); Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (1966); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-9-8 (1980).
18. See Denny v. Roth, 296 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.- Galveston 1956, writ
ref'd); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-188 (1981).
19. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 680 ("[w]hat noncompetition agreements are reasonable
restraints upon employees in this state ... is a matter of public policy .. . that policy is
fundamental in that it ensures a uniform rule for enforcement of noncompetition agreements in
this state."); Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 S.W.2d 8,
10-12 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (overbroad covenant restraining acts of employment
agency injurious to public in that it prevents fair competition and goes beyond necessary pur-
pose of promisee); Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.) ("courts are reluctant to enforce covenants which prevent
competition and deprive the community of needed goods"); Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental
Corp., 739 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ denied) ("covenants against
competition are not favored by the courts because of public policy considerations against re-
straints of trade"); Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (covenants restraining competition disfavored by courts because of
public policy against restraints of trade and hardships resulting from interference with a per-
son's means of livelihood).
20. See Frankiewicz v. National Comp Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Wea-
therford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); Arthur Murray
Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ohio 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 186 (1981).
21. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
22. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 679. In asserting that the individual and state interests
are both at stake, the court stated that "Texas is directly interested in DeSantis as an employee
in this state, in Wackenhut as a national employer doing business in this state, in RDI as a new
competitive business ... in the state, and in consumers ... in Texas." Id. at 679.
23. See Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1982, no writ).
24. Throughout this Comment, "restrictive covenants", "covenants not to compete" and
"noncompetition covenants" will be used interchangeably.
25. See Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892, 896 (1960).
26. See Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. 1973) (noncompetition agree-
ments between employers and employees are enforceable).
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limitations on the promisor's ability to compete with the promisee. 27 Once
again, in order for these covenants to survive judicial scrutiny, the restraints
must be reasonable.28 Texas courts have consistently held that the determi-
nation of whether a noncompetition covenant is reasonable is a question of
law to be decided by the court.29
C. The Common Law Principles Governing Covenants Not to Compete
The common law principles in Texas underlying the enforceability of non-
competition covenants are well settled. The Texas Supreme Court recently
reinforced the three fundamental criteria that a noncompetition agreement
must meet to constitute a reasonable restraint of trade. 30 Significantly, an
independent covenant restraining competition is unenforceable in Texas. 31
Thus, the first criterion requires the covenant not to compete to be ancillary
to an otherwise valid transaction 32 or relationship whose primary purpose is
unrelated to the suppression of competition between the parties.33 The De-
Santis court explained that the existence of a valid transaction or relation-
27. See Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. 1987).
28. See generally Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d. 950,
951 (1960) ("An agreement... not to compete... is in restraint of trade and will not be
enforced in accordance with its terms unless the same are reasonable.").
29. See Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 170 (reasonableness of covenant not to compete is question of
law); see also Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983) ("The question of
whether a covenant not to compete is reasonable is a legal question for the court."); Travel
Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd
w.o.j.) (whether covenant not to compete is reasonable is question of law for the court); Wilson
v. Chemco Chem. Co., 711 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (reasonable-
ness of restrictive covenant as to time and area is question of law to be determined by the
court); Diesel Injection & Sales & Servs., Inc. v. Renfro, 656 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Texas courts ordinarily consider determination of rea-
sonableness of a postemployment noncompetition covenant a question of law).
30. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681-82 (Tex. 1990). These princi-
ples articulated by the supreme court essentially track the requirements stated in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
31. Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 683-684 (Tex. 1974) (citing Potomac Fire
Ins. Co. v. State, 18 S.W.2d 929, 934-45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929, writ ref'd)). In Justin
Belt the court noted that an agreement between two insurance companies to limit their agents'
compensation and not to employ agents from noncomplying companies was an independent
agreement to limit competition and would be unenforceable. Id. (citing Potomac, 18 S.W.2d at
934).
32. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681-82; Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d
667, 669 (Tex. 1990). The court's reasoning in Martin illustrates the significance of the re-
quirement that the covenant be ancillary to some enforceable agreement. In Martin the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that the noncompetition covenant was not ancillary to an otherwise en-
forceable agreement for several reasons. Id. First, the employment agreement in that case
consisted entirely of a covenant not to compete and lacked the usual terms of an employment
contract. Second, employee Martin executed the covenant not to compete three years after he
was first employed by the company. Significantly, the court's reliance on this fact indicated
that the covenant needed some form of independent and supportive consideration to render it
enforceable. Finally, noting that Martin's employment would have been terminated had he
not signed the covenant, the court ruled that the covenant was not ancillary to an otherwise
valid transaction. Id.
33. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681-82; Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 669; Justin Belt, 502
S.W.2d at 683; Potomac Fire, 18 S.W.2d at 934; LPC Leasing, Inc. v. Smith, 550 S.W.2d 154,
155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 187 (1981).
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ship gives rise to an "interest worthy of protection."'34 The court specifically
identified employment relationships and the purchase and sale of a business
as otherwise valid transactions or relationships. 35 Therefore, if a covenant
not to compete is to be deemed enforceable by the courts, the employer must
demonstrate that another permissible transaction, such as the two examples
mentioned by the DeSantis court, supports the covenant. 36
The second criterion requires the restraint created by the noncompetition
covenant to be no greater than what is reasonably necessary to protect the
promisee's legitimate interest. 37 The promisee or beneficiary of a covenant
not to compete must have a legitimate interest that outweighs the restraint
created by the covenant. 38 Texas courts consider the following to be legiti-
mate and protectable interests: business goodwill;39 trade secrets; 4° excep-
34. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also LPC Leasing, 550 S.W.2d at 155 ("covenant not to compete must be
ancillary to another undertaking, such as an employment contract, an agreement for the sale
... of the business, or a settlement agreement.") Id.
37. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682; Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex.
1983); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (a) (1981).
38. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682 (citations omitted). The DeSantis court provided several
examples of "legitimate, protectable interests" including: business goodwill, trade secrets, con-
fidential information and proprietary information. Id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188 comments b, g (1981)).
39. Although Texas courts have defined goodwill in many different contexts, the meaning
is essentially the same. One widely accepted definition of goodwill is "that value which inheres
in fixed and favorable consideration of customers arising from established and well-conducted
business. Such value is based necessarily upon prospective profits to result from voluntarily
continued patronage of the public." See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mercer, 58 S.W.2d 896, 900
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 127 Tex. 220, 90 S.W.2d 557 (1936).
40. See Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 684-85 (Tex. 1973). The former em-
ployee could not disclose his former employer's trade secrets. The commonly cited definition
for a trade secret is the definition provided in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757
comment b (1977):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or pre-
serving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers
.... A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of
the business ....
To qualify as a trade secret, however, the information must actually be considered a secret.
If a matter is readily ascertainable from independent sources, it is not a secret. See generally
Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir. 1983) (to qualify
as a trade secret the information cannot be generally known by others in the same business nor
readily ascertainable by independent investigation); Gaal v. BASF Wyandotte Corp. 533
S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ) (former employee may
legitimately compete for customers where former employer's customer lists can be readily as-
certained from sources other than internal records). For a further discussion of trade secret
law, see 8 W. DORSANEO & P. WINSHIP, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE §§ 200.30-.33 (1977); see
also Comment, Noncompetition Covenants in Employment Contracts: A Texas Common Law
Analysis, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1197, 1206-07 (1983) (discussing Texas courts' recognition of
trade secrets as a protectable interest).
1014 [Vol. 45
tional and unique knowledge, skill, and ability;41 customer lists;42 actual
solicitation of clients;43 and confidential or proprietary information."
Assuming that the beneficiary possesses such a legitimate interest, applica-
tion of the second common law principle then weighs the need to protect the
beneficiary's interest against the restraint of trade. Implicit in this principle
is the requirement that limitations as to time, territory, and scope of activity
be reasonable and narrowly drawn so as to restrain occupations only to the
extent necessary to protect the promisee's business interests.45 Thus, if the
court determines that the beneficiary's protectable interest exceeds the re-
straint, the covenant not to compete satisfies the second prong.46
The third criterion requires the hardship to the promisor or any likely
injury to the public to not be greater than the promisee's need for the protec-
tion by enforcement of the noncompetition agreement. 47 In applying this
41. See Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). See also Comment, supra note 40, at 1211 n.30.
42. An ordinary customer list is not a trade secret. See Texas Shop Towel v. Haire, 246
S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, no writ); but see Zoecon, 713 F.2d at
1176 (customer list that gave employees competitive advantage was trade secret). If the em-
ployer of a business can show, however, that it spent time and resources developing its cus-
tomer list, a past employee who has signed an otherwise reasonable noncompetition covenant
will generally be precluded from using this information. See Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital
and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 97-98 (1981) (discussing the economic
efficiency in using restrictive covenants to protect legitimate employer interests).
43. See AMF Tuboscope v. McBryde, 618 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In McBryde the ex-employee and one other employee were exclusively
responsible for sales and solicitation of customers. Since the employee was hired to develop
goodwill with potential customers, the court found that the employer had a legitimate business
interest. Id. at 108. Consequently, the court enjoined the former employee from contacting any
customers. Id
Other Texas courts have reached the same conclusion. See e.g., Dittmer v. Source E D P,
Texas, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 877, 880-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (evidence demon-
strated employee's contacts with customers in computer business sufficiently valuable to con-
stitute protectable assets); Professional Beauty Prods., Inc. v. Derington, 513 S.W.2d 236, 239
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (customer contacts between former employ-
ees and customers are business interests entitled to protection of a covenant not to compete);
Kidde Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Peairson, 493 S.W.2d 326, 329-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1973, no writ) (when goodwill of employer's customers attaches to employee, restrictive
covenants are reasonable).
44. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 684 (Tex. 1990) (while confiden-
tial information is protectable by a covenant not to compete, employer is not entitled to such
protection if he or she fails to establish information is proprietary); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 188 comments b, g (19 81). See also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 501
S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ dism'd) (former employer had property
interest in protecting his business techniques and confidential business secrets where former
employee had access to such information). In Orkin the court held the employee's access to
the employer's business information and technical developments would have been unfair com-
petition since the nature of the business was highly competitive and secret. Id. at 411.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment d (1981); Frankiewicz
v. National Comp. Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502
S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1973); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951
(Tex. 1960).
46. DeSants, 793 S.W.2d at 682.
47. Id. at 682; see also Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983) (agree-
ment may not impose undue hardship on the promisor); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188(l)(b) (1981). Although this third principle is similar to the second crite-
rion, the analysis encompasses a broader inquiry.
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third principle, courts use a balancing test, weighing the possible benefits
that would result from the enforcement of the covenant not to compete
against its burdens to the promisor and to the public. 48 Again, the covenant
satisfies the third criterion if the court finds that the promisee's need for the
protection afforded by the noncompetition covenant exceeds both the hard-
ship to the promisor and any injury to the public. 49 From a practical stand-
point, Texas courts have placed more emphasis on the protection of an
employer's business and the hardship imposed upon the employee with less
emphasis on the public interest factor.50
D. Valid Consideration Must Support a Covenant Not to Compete
As with any contract, valid consideration must support a noncompetition
covenant. 5' If a covenant not to compete is ancillary to a valid agreement,
that agreement serves as sufficient consideration for the covenant.5 2 Fur-
thermore, by requiring the covenant not to compete to be ancillary to some
permissible transaction, one commentator suggests that the courts will be
assured not only that the employee voluntarily entered into the contract in
good faith, but that the employer provided consideration in exchange for the
employee's noncompetition covenant.5 3
48. See Matlock v. Data Processing Sec., Inc., 618 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. 1981).
49. Id.
50. See Note, Sakowitz v. Steck: Texas Looks at Covenants Not to Compete, 38 BAYLOR L.
REV. 211, 215 (1986); contra Matlock, 618 S.W.2d at 329 (determination of the "reasonable-
ness of territorial restraints upon non-competition contracts requires a balance of the interests
of the employer, the employee and the public").
51. See generally DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681 n.6 (Tex. 1990)
(agreement not to compete must be supported by consideration) (citing B. Cantrell Oil Co. v.
Hino Gas Sales, 756 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (upholding
trial court's holding that pay raise and commission in return for signing contract was valid
consideration to support covenant)); Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837,
841 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (stating consideration must support covenant
and holding acceptance of employment serves as valid consideration); Chenault v. Otis Eng'g
Corp., 423 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noncom-
petition covenants executed subsequent to employment contract enforceable only when sup-
ported by consideration).
52. See Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. 1990). Signifi-
cantly, in Martin the Texas Supreme Court held that the covenant not to compete was not
ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement. In Martin the employment agreement con-
sisted solely of a covenant not to compete and had been executed three years after employee
Martin began his employment. In addition, the facts of the case indicated that Martin's em-
ployment would have been terminated had he not signed the agreement. In viewing all of these
circumstances, the Martin court was unquestionably influenced in ruling that the covenant was
unenforceable. Id.
53. See Comment, Noncompetition Covenants in Employment Contracts: A Texas Com-
mon Law Analysis, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1983). Acceptance of employment is valid
consideration for a restrictive covenant not to compete. See Carl Coiffure, Inc. v. Mouriot, 410
S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Garcia v. Laredo
Collections, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ) ("When the
execution of a covenant not to compete is contemporaneous with the acceptance of employ-
ment the latter becomes the consideration .... "). Employment-at-will relationships are not
binding upon either the employer or the employee since either party is free to terminate the
employment at any time. Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670. Thus, continuation of an employment-
at-will does not constitute independent valuable consideration necessary to support the cove-
nant. But see Arevalo v. Velvet Door, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
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Section 15.50 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code adds one qualifi-
cation to the requirement of consideration for covenants not to compete.
Under section 15.50(1), 54 a covenant not to compete, executed on a date
other than the date on which the underlying agreement was executed, is
enforceable only if independent valuable consideration supports the cove-
nant.55 The DeSantis court reasoned, contrary to Bland v. Henry & Peter
P. C,56 that although consideration could include special training or knowl-
edge to the promisor,57 consideration was not limited to these two types.
58
E. Burden of Persuasion in Proving Reasonableness of Covenant Not to
Compete
The party seeking to enforce the postemployment noncompetition cove-
nant has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the covenant. 59
Consequently, whether an interest is sufficiently protectable to merit an in-
junction to enforce a covenant will depend on the employer's ability to estab-
lish the reasonableness of the covenant's terms. Accordingly, the
overwhelming majority of Texas courts have required, in the postemploy-
ment noncompetition context, the employer meet this burden of establishing
a protectable business interest before the noncompetition covenant will be
enforced against his former employee. 60 Although some authority exists to
the contrary, 61 the vast majority of Texas courts place the burden on the
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (consideration need not be monetary, but may take the form of contin-
ued employment in exchange for the covenant).
54. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
55. See Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670 (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681); see infra note 173
and accompanying text.
56. 763 S.W.2d. 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied).
57. See Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 669. The court suggested that special training or knowl-
edge acquired by an employee during employment, such as unique, extensive, or confidential
training might constitute independent valuable consideration. Id. Customer information, the
court argued, was not special training or knowledge. Id. Thus, the court refused to enforce
the noncompetition covenant against Martin because it lacked supportive independent consid-
eration. Id.
58. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681 (Tex. 1990). In this regard, the
DeSantis court expressed its disapproval with the language in Bland suggesting that special
training and knowledge were the only forms of valuable consideration. Id.
59. See McKelvey, Postemployment Noncompetitive Restrictive Covenants in Texas, 30 S.
TEX. L.J. 1, 5 (1988).
60. See Voorhees v. Johnson, 538 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no
writ) (burden of proof is on former employer to show what is reasonably necessary to protect
his business); Hospital Consultants, Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer has burden to show noncompetition covenant rea-
sonable through existence of supporting facts); Munzenreider & Assocs. v. Daigle, 525 S.W.2d
288, 291-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ) (burden is on former employer to
establish covenant is no greater than reasonably necessary to protect business interest and
goodwill); Martin v. Kidde Sales & Serv., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1973, no writ) (burden of proof is on former employer to establish both necessity for, and
reasonableness of, restrictive covenant it seeks to enforce).
61. Some reported cases in Texas have stated that the burden of proof is on the person
challenging the enforcement of the covenant not to compete, and in most cases that person is
the employee. See Arrow Chem. Corp. v. Pugh, 490 S.W.2d 628, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1972, no writ); see also Mosimann v. Employers Casualty Co., 354 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex. Civ.




Courts place this burden of proof upon employers because they are osten-
sibly in the best position to gather, organize, and produce evidence. Such
evidence is crucial to the court's reasonableness determination and may in-
clude sales records, training materials and records, customer lists, employee
records, and other relevant information regarding the execution of the non-
competition covenant. 63 The employer, rather than the employee, is in the
best position to gather evidence because he has free access to such informa-
tion. Moreover, information solely within the employer's possession regard-
ing the types of activities actually performed by the employee during the
period of his employment will be valuable in establishing that the noncompe-
tition covenant is necessary and reasonable. The employer's legitimate need
argument is more persuasive if the employee has unique or extraordinary job
responsibilities. If so, the employer can more effectively argue harm to his
business since such an employee would presumably be difficult to replace.
Based upon the new legislation, the burden of persuasion for the reasona-
bleness issue shifts depending on whether the contract at issue is for personal
services" or non-personal services.65 If the underlying agreement's primary
purpose is to obligate the promisor to render personal services, the benefici-
ary carries the burden of establishing" that the covenant not to compete
meets the criteria specified in section 15.50(2).67 On the other hand, if the
matter of law, it is presumptively valid, and burden to prove otherwise is on the party seeking
to avoid liability under it); see Newman, Restrictive Covenants In Employment Contracts, 35
TEX. B.J. 225, 227 (1972).
62. See e.g., Allan J. Richardson & Assocs., Inc. v. Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (burden of proving the reasonableness of and ne-
cessity for noncompetition covenant must be borne by employer); Martin v. Linen Sys. for
Hosps., Inc., 671 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (employer
carries burden of proving necessity for and reasonableness of noncompetition agreement);
Waddell v. Lee, 562 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ)
(former employer must establish through competent evidence both necessity and reasonable-
ness of covenant). The temporary injunction is the most common method by which an em-
ployer seeks to enforce the noncompetition covenant. Placing the burden on the employer is
consistent with the typical burdens in a temporary injunction suit. Texas courts require the
employer to demonstrate probable right to prevail on the merits and probable injury with
regard to a legitimate business interest in order to justify enjoining the employee engaging in
competitive activity. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968).
63. See McKelvey, supra note 59, at 6.
64. An example of a personal service contract is a standard contract between an employer
and an employee. See Gray, Covenants Not To Compete, 1990 TEX. B.J. 585, 586.
65. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991). This phrase
speaks to the question of whether the agreement's primary purpose is for the rendition of
personal services as opposed to a different primary purpose. Since the statute distinguishes
between these two types of contracts, courts will treat them differently. Id.
Examples of contracts for non-personal services are contracts providing for the sale of stock
or assets of a business, sales of franchises, partnership agreements, and leases. Gray, supra
note 64, at 586.
66. According to § 15.51(b), "the burden of establishing a fact means the burden of per-
suading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence."
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
67. Id. § 15.51(b). Assuming the contract is one that obligates the promisor to render
personal services, § 15.50(b) requires the promisee to make two showings to establish reasona-
bleness: (1) that the covenant incorporate "reasonable limitations as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained (2) that do not impose a greater restraint than is neces-
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agreement contains a different primary purpose, such as a contract for non-
personal services, the legislation shifts to the promisor the burden of estab-
lishing that the covenant not to compete fails to meet the criteria listed in
section 15.50(2).68 In other words, the promisor must show that the cove-
nant contains limitations as to time, territory, and scope of activity that are
not necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
promisee. 69
In sharp contrast, courts do not place a similar burden on the promisee in
covenants not to compete for the sale of a business.70 In Daniel v. Goes17'
the court first noted that separate standards concerning the burden of proof
governed the two types of noncompetition covenants. 72 Unlike the postem-
ployment setting, a promisee seeking injunctive relief is not required to es-
tablish a probable right to prevail on the merits and probable injury because
courts effectively presume harm following a breach of the covenant not to
compete. 73 The court in Daniel concluded that in such situations, damages
would be an inappropriate remedy.74
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NONCOMPETITION
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
A. Types of Noncompetition Covenants Recognized in Texas
Two main categories of covenants not to compete exist in Texas: (1) cove-
nants in which the promisor/seller of a business agrees not compete with the
promisee/buyer of the business75 and (2) covenants in which the prom-
isor/employee agrees not to compete with the promisee/employer upon ter-
mination of the employment relationship. 76 Historically, courts have not
enforced all postemployment covenants. 77 Most jurisdictions, however, cur-
sary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee." Id. Gray offers sev-
eral examples of evidence that a beneficiary/promisee could present to demonstrate the
reasonableness of a covenant not to compete: (1) investment in an employee through training
or imparting knowledge; and (2) possession of confidential or proprietary information by an
employee. Gray, supra note 64, at 586.
68. Id. § 15.51(b); see supra note 67.
69. Id. § 15.50(2). Gray remarks that "[o]nly in unusual circumstances would the prom-
isor be able to sustain this burden of proof." Gray, supra note 64, at 586.
70. See Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892, 896 (1960); see supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text.
71. 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892, 896 (1960).
72. Id. at 892.
73. Id. at 896.
74. Id.
75. See Daniel, 341 S.W.2d at 896.
76. Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. 1973).
77. At early common law, postemployment noncompetition covenants were not allowed
since courts viewed them as unreasonable restraints on trade and livelihood. See generally
Colgate v. Bacheler, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097, 1097 (Q.B. 1602) (voiding noncompetition covenant
even though of limited duration and geographic scope and could be removed by payment); The
Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, fo. 4, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414) (restraint voided without regard to
geographical scope, duration, or reasonableness because illegal at common law); see Carpenter,
Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 244-45 (1928). Professor Blake
stresses the significant impact that the guild system governing medieval economy had in shap-
ing courts' initial harsh reaction to covenants not to compete. See Blake, supra note 3, at 632-
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rently enforce the restrictions that they determine to be reasonable. 78 Be-
cause covenants incident to the sale of a business and postemployment
noncompetition covenants arise under different factual contexts, separate
and distinct principles govern each type of covenant. 79
Some of the earliest Texas cases considering the enforceability of noncom-
petition covenants eschewed distinctions between noncompetitive restrictive
covenants contained in employment contracts and similar covenants con-
tained in contracts for the sale of a business.80 A few early Texas cases,
however,distinguished restrictive covenants incident to the sale of a business
34. Commentators urge that the strict per se rule against noncompetition covenants generally
existed because the Black Death had eradicated so much of the work force in fourteenth cen-
tury England that the economy could not afford such restrictions on the alienability of labor.
See Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 722-23 (1982).
By the eighteenth century, the apprentice system of the guilds was disappearing and the
economic consequences of noncompetition covenants had diminished. See Blake, supra note 3,
at 638. Consequently, in Mitchel v. Reynolds the court replaced the per se rule with a reasona-
bleness inquiry. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 353 (Q.B. 1711) (court upheld non-
competition covenant where seller of bake shop agreed to pay lessee liquidated damages sum if
he breached the covenant by competing in the business within designated area during the five
year lease).
The salient issue in Mitchel was a restrictive covenant incident to the sale of a business
rather than postemployment activities. The court cautioned, however, that postemployment
noncompetition covenants were subject to "great abuses... from masters, who are apt to give
their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure
such bonds from them .... Id. at 350. The reasonableness test was nevertheless eventually
applied in the employment context as well and, indeed, the "Mitchel v. Reynolds approach has
survived virtually unchanged to the present-day." See Comment, Post-Employment Restraint
Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 703, 709 (1985).
78. See 14 S. WILLISTON, supra note 17, § 1636; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 186 (1981) (agreement in restraint of trade unenforceable if "unreasonably" re-
strains trade); Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing With
Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (1973).
79. See Daniel v. Goesi, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892, 896 (1960). In Daniel the court
noted that separate standards controlled the two types of noncompetition covenants. Id. at
895-96. In this case, several doctors who formed a partnership executed a restrictive covenant
providing that a retiring partner would not practice medicine, either directly or indirectly, for
three years subsequent to his retirement. The remaining partners were obligated to execute a
note to the retiring partner for an amount reflecting the book value and goodwill of the part-
nership. The court treated this obligation as a sale of the retiring partner's holding in the
partnership. Id. at 894-95. Consequently, when one of the doctors started his own practice,
the court found he violated the covenant not to compete and issued a temporary injunction.
Id. at 894. The retiring partner challenged the issuance of the injunction on the basis that the
remaining partners failed to show irreparable injury to the partnership or that the covenant
was reasonable and necessary to protect their medical practice. Id. at 895-96. Significantly,
the court of appeals openly rejected this argument and ruled that although the argument was
meritorious in the postemployment context, the argument was inapplicable to a covenant inci-
dent to the sale of a business. Id. at 896. The court went on to state that the remaining
partners did not need to establish irreparable harm because "[w]here an established business
has been sold with its goodwill and there is a valid covenant not to compete, a breach is
regarded as the controlling factor and injunctive relief follows almost as a matter of course
.... .Id. (quote currently found at 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 94 (1978)).
80. See Gates v. Hooper, 90 Tex. 563, 565, 39 S.W. 1079, 1080 (1897). In Gates, Hooper,
a merchant in Batesville, retired and sold his business to Gates. Included in the contract for
sale of the business was a provision in which Hooper agreed not to engage in any business in
Batesville for one year. The Supreme Court of Texas remanded and reversed the lower court's
ruling that held the agreement not to compete void and held that the covenant in question did
not violate the Texas Trust Act. Id. The court recognized that such covenants were necessary
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and restrictive covenants contained in employment contracts. 81 Further-
more, present-day Texas courts recognize the distinctions between the two
types of covenants.8 2
B. The Judicial Evolution of a Reasonableness Test to Determine the
Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete
In most of the early Texas cases, the courts enforced such covenants ac-
cording to the letter of their terms.8 3 Occasionally, however, the courts re-
in order to assist the purchaser of a business in acquiring the seller's customers in the area
serviced by the business. Id.
Subsequently, in Randolph v. Graham, 254 S.W. 402, 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1923, writ ref'd), a physician agreed to refrain from practicing either in Schertz or within a 20-
mile radius of Schertz at any time subsequent to the sale of his practice in Schertz, Texas. The
court of appeals held that the contract provision in question did not constitute an unreasonable
restraint on trade as applied to a skilled artisan or professional. Id. at 402-03. The San
Antonio court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that the area limitation imposed
by the covenant was not unreasonable and that the public interest would not be damaged by
such an agreement. Id. at 403. The court further noted that given the extremely limited and
narrow geographic area delineated in the restrictive covenant, the lack of a time restraint did
not render the restriction unreasonable. Id.
In Texas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. McGoldrick, 284 S.W. 615, 616-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1926, writ ref'd) McGoldrick sold his ice business in Dallas to a large ice com-
pany for which he subsequently became an employee. The contract for the sale of McGold-
rick's business included a noncompetition restrictive covenant stating that McGoldrick would
not engage in the ice business within the city of Dallas for two years following the termination
of his relationship with the ice company. After subsequently being laid off, McGoldrick
sought to engage in the selling of ice to ice merchants and peddlers on a wholesale basis rather
than selling to individual customers on a retail basis as he had previously done during his
employ. The court held that the noncompetition covenant was valid and that the contractual
restriction effectively prevented McGoldrick from engaging in the wholesaling as well as the
retailing of ice within the city of Dallas. Id.
81. For the earliest Texas case recognizing the distinction between noncompetition cove-
nants for the sale of a business and similar noncompetition covenants contained in employ-
ment contracts, see Miller v. Chicago Portrait Co., 195 S.W. 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1917, writ ref'd). In Miller a portrait company sought to enforce a one-year noncom-
petition covenant and a one thousand dollar liquidated damages provision contained in
Miller's employment contract after he left the company and began engaging in competitive
business. The trial court granted the portrait company injunctive relief. On appeal, the court
held that the parties intended the liquidated damages provision as the only available relief in
case of breach of the noncompetition covenant. The Miller court, in discussing the general
state policies regarding postemployment noncompetition covenants, noted:
Courts will not favor contracts that would drive a man out of Texas to seek
occupation in a business, with which he is perhaps better acquainted than any
other, or put him in another business for which he is not trained or suited. This
is a different case from the sale of a business induced by a contract not to engage
in a similar business in a named locality in a specified time. The contract in this
case is aimed at the right to obtain employment in a similar business. It is an
attempt to restrain the right to earn a living ....
Id. at 621 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the San Antonio court of appeals reversed the trial
court's issuance of a temporary injunction and remanded the case. Id.
82. See generally Hospital Consultants, Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (restrictive covenant in sale of a business or good-
will is quite different from postemployment restrictions). As the Hill court suggested, perhaps
the reason for the perceived difference lies in the fact that the postemployment noncompetition
covenants receive greater scrutiny since employers are presumed to have a superior bargaining
position compared to the employee. This inequality of bargaining power is arguably not as
evident in the context of selling a business.
83. See generally McKelvey, supra note 59, at 8 (discussing enforcement of early postem-
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fused to enforce the covenants as written and began to carve out a
reasonableness standard with regard to the temporal limitations imposed by
the covenants.8 4 In a case that is illustrative of this trend, Carpenter v.
Southern Properties, Inc. ,85 the Dallas court of appeals specifically held that
noncompetition covenants would be upheld if they contained a reasonable
time limitation. 86 In so holding, the court emphasized the fact that the em-
ployer properly held the burden of establishing a protectable interest since
Texas courts did not look upon noncompetition covenants favorably.87
Although in this instance the court ultimately enforced the restrictive cove-
nant, finding it both reasonable and necessary to protect the business inter-
ests of Southern Properties, Texas courts appeared to be developing, at least
with respect to time limitations, a reasonableness standard for evaluating the
enforceability of noncompetition covenants. In fact, in a subsequent case,
Martin v. Hawley,88 the Dallas court of appeals reaffirmed its previous hold-
ing and stated that the applicable standard in determining the covenant's
validity was whether the restrictive clause was reasonably necessary to pro-
tect the goodwill of the employer's business. 89 The court further held that
for the covenant to be enforceable, the time restrictions should be limited
and the territorial restriction should be limited to the geographical areas that
the employee serviced during his employmentY"
In a few early Texas cases regarding the enforceability of noncompetition
ployment noncompetition covenants); see Jennings v. Shephard Laundries Co., 276 S.W.2d
726, 726-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1925, no writ) (court enjoined employee to full extent
permitted by covenant not to compete); see supra cases cited in note 80.
84. See Carpenter v. Southern Properties, Inc., 299 S.W. 440, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las 1927, writ ref'd).
85. Id. Carpenter managed and owned his own ice delivery business for over twenty years
in a West Dallas location. He subsequently sold the assets and equipment of the business to
Southern Properties and became a Southern employee, delivering ice within the same territo-
rial areas he had serviced as a proprietor. Included in the contract for sale of Carpenter's
business was a provision in which he agreed not to engage in any competitive activities such as
the sale or delivery of ice within the city of Dallas for a two year period following termination
of his relationship with Southern Properties.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 50 S.W.2d 1105, 1108-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ). Hawley, the past
employee, executed a noncompetition agreement providing that he would refrain from engag-
ing in any competitive activities with his former employer, a water company, for a period of
five years. One year later, however, Hawley became the owner and operator of a corporation
selling distilled water. Martin, the employer, brought suit to enjoin Hawley from competing
with his business. The court underscored their concern that "contracts restricting the liberty
of employment are not viewed by the courts with favor." Id. at 1108. While the court ulti-
mately held that the five-year period was not unreasonable as a matter of law, the court held
that the lack of any geographical area limitation within the terms of the covenant rendered the
covenant void on its face. Id. at 1108-09.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1108. Some of the other early Texas cases concerning noncompetition cove-
nants contained in employment contracts began to reflect the view that geographical scope
limitations not only be reasonable, but that they also be limited to the areas in which the
former employee had actually performed his duties. See City Ice Delivery Co. v. Evans, 275
S.W. 87, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1925, no writ) (employer established necessity for restric-
tive covenant encompassing the territory or routes in which the former employee had actually
delivered ice to the customers of City Ice); Comment, supra note 40, at 1208. See also Bet-
tinger v. North Fort Worth Ice Co., 278 S.W. 466, 470-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1925,
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covenants, at least one appellate court9 recognized a distinction between the
types of services provided by employees who dealt directly with customers,
such as the services provided by the route salesmen and ice delivery truck
drivers, and those services involving little, if any, contact with customers. 92
The apparent difference was that route salesmen could potentially develop
greater personal rapport and client relations that would induce these clients
to follow with them if they started a competitive business. 93 By the very
nature of the employee's duties, the court of appeals reasoned that Byers
would not be able to develop such rapport with clients, nor be likely to se-
cure their business for his own competitive endeavors. 94 This distinction
disappeared from Texas case law during the following decades.9 5
Texas courts began to emphasize the protection of the business and good-
will of the employer as the pivotal factors in determining the enforceability
of noncompetition covenants.96 Consequently, some of the later Texas cases
focused exclusively on whether the duration and geographical scope covered
by the noncompetition covenant were reasonably necessary to protect the
business and goodwill of the former employer.97
In the landmark case of Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell,9" the
Supreme Court of Texas first articulated a judicial standard for determining
the enforceability of noncompetition covenants. 99 The court noted at the
outset that noncompetition covenants were in restraint of trade and thus
must be reasonable before they would be enforced.100 In declaring the
proper test to evaluate the covenant's validity, the Weatherford court stated
no writ) (court held that trial court should have limited scope of injunction issued in favor of
employer to areas actually covered by employee's former routes).
91. See Byers v. Pecos-Abstract Co., 18 S.W.2d 1096, 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1929, writ dism'd).
92. Id. In Byers an abstract company sought to enforce a two-year noncompetition cove-
nant restraining former employee Byers from pursuing future work as an abstractor in Brew-
ster County. The trial court initially enjoined Byers from competing in the abstract business
for two years, relying on the fact that during his employ, Byers had acquired knowledge of the
business, clientele, books, records, and methods. Id. at 1098. The court of appeals distin-
guished the type of services provided by Byers and those services provided by route salesmen.
Id. at 1099. First, the court noted that employees assigned to solicit customers in a certain
territory or route were not engaged in the work of a common laborer, unlike Byers. Instead,
the court reasoned that employers generally held route salesmen, along with persons engaging
in similar activities, personally responsible for promoting the success of the business. Id.
Next, the court argued that Byers could not be reasonably expected to take the customers or
clients with him when he left the company, taking into account the types of activities Byers
performed during his employ. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and
ordered that the temporary injunction be dissolved. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See McKelvey, supra note 59, at 16.
96. Id.; see Southern Properties, Inc. v. Carpenter, 21 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1929, writ dism'd).
97. See Southern Properties, 21 S.W.2d at 375; Byers v. Pecos-Abstract Co., 18 S.W.2d
1096, 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1929, writ dism'd).
98. 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960).
99. Id. at 951.
100. Id. at 951. The court stated that "[a]n agreement on the part of an employee not to
compete with his employer after termination of the employment is in restraint of trade and will
not be enforced in accordance with its terms unless the same are reasonable." Id.
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that the covenant must not "impose[ ] any greater restraint [upon the em-
ployee] than is reasonably necessary to protect the business and goodwill of
the employer."'' 1 In so holding, the court introduced an additional consid-
eration into the determination of a covenant's validity-the hardship to the
employee created by the restraint. Furthermore, the court held that a re-
straint on competition is unreasonable "if it is greater than is required for the
protection of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes
undue hardship upon the poerson restricted."1 0 2
The Weatherford court emphasized the importance of the duration of the
restraint and the geographical limitations imposed by the covenant. 103 The
court further held that the covenant not to compete must bear some relation
to the employee's activities.Y°4 If a restriction contained in a noncompetition
covenant is overbroad as to time, territory, or scope of activity, the covenant
will not satisfy this requirement. 105
C. The Adoption of a Four-Part Reasonableness Test and the Common
Calling Standard: Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc.
The test announced in Weatherford remained the prevailing standard for
judging the enforceability of postemployment noncompetition covenants un-
til the Texas Supreme Court's landmark decision in Hill v. Mobile Auto
Trim, Inc. lO6 In that case, Mobile Auto Trim, the franchisor, obtained a
101. Id. Further, the Weatherford court explained that under the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS a restraint of trade is unreasonable "if it is greater than is required for
the protection of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes undue hard-
ship upon the person restricted." Id.
102. Id. Additionally, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) provides that
a covenant is unenforceable if it is an unreasonable restraint on competition. Section 187 states
that a covenant that is not ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship is unreasonable.
Section 188 says that a covenant is unreasonable if the restraint is greater than is needed to
protect the promisee's legitimate interests or if the promisee's need is outweighed by the hard-
ship to the promisor and the interest of the public.
103. Weatherford, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
104. Id. at 952 (quoting Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819,
820 (Wis. 1933)).
105. See Tandy Brands, Inc., v. Harper, 760 F.2d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1985) (covenant cover-
ing "almost all of the North American continent" unreasonable) (applying Texas law); see also
Matlock v. Data Processing Sec., Inc., 618 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. 1981) (covenant prohibiting
competition in the entire United States invalidated since employer did not serve such an expan-
sive market). In effect, the reasonableness of the territorial limitation will turn on whether the
area is limited to the area that the former employee actually covered during his employ. Com-
pare Cawse-Morgan v. Murray, 633 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ) (twenty-five mile limitation overbroad) with Gillen v. Diadrill, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 259, 263
(Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (limitation covering marketing areas previously
served by employee reasonable) and Martin v. Kidde Sales & Serv. Inc., 496 S.W.2d 714, 718-
19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ) (limitation covering Harris County unreasonable).
106. 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987). Hill involved a franchise agreement executed be-
tween the franchisee Hill and the franchisor Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., (Mobile), covering seven
counties, including all of Denton County and a substantial part of Dallas County. Mobile sold
car trim franchises which required the franchisees to drive equipped vans to car dealerships in
order to make car repairs on the dealerships' premises. The franchise agreement contained a
covenant not to compete, providing that Hill would not compete with the business or any of
the franchisees upon termination of his franchise. Accordingly, Hill agreed to tender a
purchase price of $42,000 plus 5% of his gross revenues in the franchise. The covenant not to
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temporary injunction to enforce the covenant not to compete contained in
the franchise agreement.10 7 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed both
lower courts, declaring the covenant not to compete unenforceable.10 8
While the court repeated the fundamental principle that covenants not to
compete had to be reasonable in order to be enforced by courts,'°9 the Hill
decision marked a dramatic shift by Texas courts from the post-Weatherford
practice of reforming unreasonable covenants.
Rather than reforming the covenant as the dissent would have done, the
court instead adopted a new test from the Supreme Court of Utah in Robbins
v. Finlay,110 known as the common calling standard. Specifically, the Hill
court held that covenants not to compete created primarily to limit competi-
tion or restrain the rights of individuals to engage in common occupations
were unenforceable.II 1  Beyond the court's mere declaration that Texas
courts would apply the Utah standard,1 12 the court did not elaborate on the
precise meaning of the common calling standard, nor did they provide any
guidance as to what types of occupations would fall within the standard.' 13
With the Hill court's assertion that restrictive covenants within the sphere of
common callings were conclusively unenforceable, Texas courts would be
precluded from employing the balancing test when the court found the em-
ployee engaged in a common calling. 14
compete extended for three years beyond Hill's termination of employment. Hill conducted
business as Mobile's franchisee for two and a half years, contacting car dealerships and making
auto trim repairs in his two-county area. When Hill subsequently fell behind on his franchise
fees for several months, Mobile picked up his van and cancelled the franchise agreement. That
same day, Hill contacted a car dealership manager within Dallas County who had previously
been a Mobile customer.
107. Id. at 170. The trial court granted the temporary injunction covering the seven-
county and three-year restrictions contained in the covenant not to compete, and the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. In so doing, the Hill court reinforced the previously accepted standard set forth in
Weatherford, stating that a covenant is unreasonable "if it is greater than is required for the
protection of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes undue hardship
upon the person restricted." Id. at 170 (quoting Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161
Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960)).
110. 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982).
111. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 172 (citing Robbins, 645 P.2d at 627).
112. Although the Supreme Court of Utah first utilized the common calling test which the
Texas Supreme Court later adopted, even the Utah court itself later ignored the common call-
ing test in holding a covenant not to compete enforceable in a decision after Robbins. See
System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983); LaFuze, Proposed Covenant
Not To Compete, 52 TEX. B.J. 149, 150 (1989).
113. Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987) (quoting Robbins,
645 P.2d at 627). The court, however, suggested that a common calling consists of activities
that do not require extensive, highly sophisticated training in a complex field. The level of
sophistication that will prevent an occupation from being designated a common calling is un-
certain. See McKelvey, supra note 59, at 93-94. See also Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d
636, 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (noncompetition agreement held
enforceable after finding that employee received extensive, unique, and confidential training
from employer).
114. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 172. The prevailing standard prior to Hill, as set forth in Wea-
therford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960), called for a balancing
of the business interest of the employer, the hardship to the employee, and the free competition
interests of the public. Id. at 951.
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Significantly, the Hill court set forth a four-part reasonableness test based
on prior case law for determining the enforceability of all covenants not to
compete under Texas law. "5 The four criteria are as follows: first, the cove-
nant must be necessary for the protection of the promisee, generally meaning
that the promisee must have a legitimate interest in business goodwill or
trade secrets that is worthy of protection;" 6 second, the covenant must not
be oppressive to the promisor;' 1 7 third, the covenant must not be injurious to
the public;" 8 and fourth, the covenant must be supported by considera-
tion."19 To date, the Texas Supreme Court has not provided a definition of
common calling.' 20 Moreover, the court left unanswered the perplexing
question of what effect the standard would have on previous case law, partic-
ularly the Weatherford decision. 121
In a subsequent case, Bergman v. Norris of Houston,122 the Supreme Court
of Texas attempted to expand the common calling standard while further
limiting the scope of enforceable noncompetition covenants. 23 In Bergman
the court invalidated postemployment noncompetition covenants contained
in the employment contracts of three hairstylists, a manicurist, and the man-
ager of a hairdressing salon.' 24 The court noted that the manager's duties
did not substantially differ from those of the hairstylists. 25 The court re-
fused to enforce the restrictive covenants on the basis that they restrained
the right to engage in a common calling.126 The court specifically stated that
barbering was a common calling occupation. 127 In creating this additional
common calling class, the supreme court presumably meant to clarify its
previous holding in Hill.128 Nevertheless, the standard remained vague and
115. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 170-71.
116. Id
117. Id. With regard to this second prong, the court indicated that time, territory, and
scope of activity limitations had to be reasonable. Id. at 171.
118. Id. In articulating the public interest prong, the court noted that "courts are reluctant
to enforce covenants which prevent competition and deprive the community of needed goods."
Id. (citing Weatherford, 340 S.W.2d at 951).
119. Id. at 171.
120. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 177 (Gonzales, J., dissenting). Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court
in Robbins, the case from which the Texas Supreme Court borrowed the standard, is silent as
to any definition for the standard.
121. Id. at 175.
122. 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987).
123. Id. at 674.
124. Id. at 674-75. In this case, the three hairstylists and a manager signed noncompetition
covenants contained in their employment contracts providing that for a three-year period and
within a fifteen-mile radius, they would not "compete in any hair styling or barbering business,
divulge any trade secret, or solicit or divert customers from Norris." Id. at 674. The former
employees left one salon, Norris, and began working at another nearby salon located approxi-
mately three miles from the Norris salon. The former employees also took a large number of
their clientele with them after leaving Norris. The owner of the first salon brought suit on the
covenants signed by the former employees.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. 1987) ("[b]arbering, how-
ever labeled, is a common calling.").
128. In fact, the Bergman court held that the issue of whether an employee is engaged in a
common calling is a question of law to be decided on a case-by-case basis in light of the sur-
rounding facts. Id.
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unclear, providing relatively little guidance for the appellate courts.
IV. THE PRESENT STATUS OF TEXAS CASE LAW ON
POSTEMPLOYMENT NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS
A. The Struggle in Applying the Common Calling Standard
Several recent cases have provided examples of what is and what is not a
common calling.129 The absence of a supreme court definition of common
calling has left the determination of which occupations qualify as common
callings solely to judicial interpretation. The supreme court's failure to ar-
ticulate a precise definition has produced a quandary in the lower courts in
attempting to delineate the parameters for the standard's application to post-
employment restrictive covenants.
For example, in Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc.,130 the court of
appeals, unable to find an applicable definition of the term, common calling,
consulted a conventional dictionary and combined the separate definitions
for "common" and "calling" in order to create a functional definition. 131
The court found that a common calling was "a vocation or profession of the
usual type which is entirely ordinary and undistinguished."' 132 Applying
this formulation, the court held that an office manager of a travel agency was
not engaged in a common calling. 13 3 The court then employed the four-part
129. Compare Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626, 626 (July 13,
1988), withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (salesman is a common calling); Bergman, 734
S.W.2d at 673 (barbering is a common calling); Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 172 (auto trim repairman
is a common calling) with DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616 (July 13,
1988), withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (office manager who was key employee was not
engaged in a common calling) and Travel Masters Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837,
841 ('ex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (travel agent who was also office manager
was not engaged in a common calling).
130. 742 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.). In this case
Goldsmith, a travel agent and office manager, signed a noncompetition agreement with her
employer, Star Tours, providing that she would "not disclose to any other persons, firms, or
entities in the same or similar business as Employer, the names of customers." Id. After
leaving Star Tours, Goldsmith subsequently joined another travel agency, violating the terms
of the noncompetition agreement. The trial court entered a temporary injunction restraining
the former employee from soliciting a specified list of Star Tours' customers. Id. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court, relying on the fact that Goldsmith actually solicited the clients
and thus caused financial hardship to Star Tours as evidenced by a sharp decline in its busi-
ness. Id
131. Id. at 840. The Dallas court of appeals found that common is defined as" 'of a usual
type or standard; quite usual and average; entirely ordinary and undistinguished.' " Calling
means "'the activity in which one customarily engages as a vocation or profession.' " Id. at
840-41.
132. Id. (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 458 (3d ed. 1981)).
133. Id at 841. See also Cujkati v. Burkett, 772 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989,
no writ) (veterinarian/office manager not engaged in common calling). Accordingly, in
Cujkati the Dallas court of appeals analyzed the noncompetition covenant in question under
the Hill framework. The court first concluded that Cujkati, the owner and employer of the
veterinary clinic, did not have a legitimate interest in protecting its business since the employee
had not received any special training nor acquired any trade secrets warranting such protec-
tion. Id at 217. Next, the court found that a twelve-mile restriction was unreasonable based
on the fact that most pet owners traveled short distances to obtain pet care. Finally, the court
found that there was no consideration to support the noncompetition covenant, relying on the
supreme court's previous holding in DeSantis, in which the court found a lack of consideration
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Hill analysis and upheld the enforceability of the noncompetition
covenant. 134
In another case, B. Cantrell Oil Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc.' 35 the court
reviewed the Travel Masters opinion and elucidated the definition for com-
mon calling somewhat, adding that a person engaged in a common calling is
"one who performs a generic task for a living, one that changes little no
matter for whom or where an employee works."' 36 In Hoddeson v. Conroe
Ear, Nose, & Throat Associates ' 37 the court attempted to apply the common
calling standard without furnishing a definition for it.138 Over a vigorous
dissent, the Hoddeson court held that a doctor specializing in ear, nose, and
throat medicine was engaged in a common calling. 39 The Hoddeson court
asserted that absent clear and convincing proof to the contrary, a presump-
tion that the employee had not bargained away the future use of his talents
properly applied.140 A comparison of the definitions formulated by the
courts in Travel Masters and Hoddeson reveals inconsistencies in the applica-
tion of the common calling standard. Unfortunately, neither the dictionary
because the employee had prior experience and did not obtain special knowledge or training.
Id. at 218 (quoting Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1987)).
134. Id. at 840. Applying the four-pronged test of Hill, the Travel Masters court found
that: (1) the covenant was necessary since the travel agency business was a competitive busi-
ness and the business goodwill and the customer list were important to the business's contin-
ued success; (2) the covenant was not oppressive to the promisor since the former employee
could seek work anywhere, and since the only limitation simply prohibited the employee from
soliciting any of the travel agency's clients for two years; (3) the public would not be harmed
by restricting the former employee from soliciting a limited number of Star Tours' clients; and
(4) the former employee received valid consideration in the form of continued employment and
additional training for her managerial position. Id. at 840-41.
135. 756 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). In B. Cantrell, em-
ployee Renteria worked for Hino Gas as a retail operations manager under -an employment
contract providing that he would not compete against Hino Gas in Cameron County for 18
months after termination of employment. Renteria subsequently went to work for Lone Star, a
new competitor with Hino Gas. Hino Gas ultimately obtained an injunction preventing
Renteria from violating the noncompetition covenant. The court of appeals affirmed, finding
that the covenant was necessary for the protection of the company's confidential operations
and that the temporal and territorial limitations were not oppressive to Renteria. Id. The
court further held that the covenant was not injurious to the public, based on evidence that the
propane business had escalated in Renteria's absence and that the price of gas had decreased.
Id. Finally, the court ruled that Renteria's pay raise and share of company profits constituted
valuable consideration supporting the covenant. Id.
136. Id.
137. 751 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
138. Id. at 290. In Hoddeson, the Beaumont court of appeals reversed the trial court's
issuance of a temporary injunction and refused to enforce a noncompetition covenant between
a physician certified as an ear, nose, and throat specialist and his employer/clinic; the covenant
restrained the doctor from practicing medicine in Montgomery County for five years after his
termination of employment. Id. While the court found that the covenant violated each of the
four Hill criteria in some respects, the court grounded much of its holding on the fact that the
covenant was injurious to the public because it was designed solely to protect the clinic from
competition. Id.
139. Id. In so holding, the court noted that the professional association, in its capacity as
the doctor's employer, "did not impart trade secrets, specialized training, or confidential infor-
mation to [the doctor]," and thus the covenant, if enforced, would effectively prevent the doc-
tor "from using his previously acquired skills and talent to support him and his family.
Id.
140. Id. (quoting Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987)).
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definitions of the words "common" and "calling" nor the holding that an
ear, nose, and throat specialist is a common calling occupation will prove
instructive to lower courts in their future attempts to determine whether a
particular occupation is a common calling.
Following Hill and its progeny, the courts placed noncompetition cove-
nants under greater scrutiny, mandating strict compliance with the four-
pronged Hill standard as a prerequisite for enforceability.' 4' The courts
stated that only covenants involving either the sale of a business or the im-
parting of specialized training or knowledge to the employee were enforcea-
ble. 142 Finally, if the primary purpose of a covenant was to limit
competition and restrain the right of an individual to engage in a common
calling, under no circumstances would the courts enforce such noncompeti-
tion covenants. 143
B. Two Recent Texas Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court of Texas continued its assault upon contractual re-
straints on competition imposed by covenants not to compete in two recent
cases. First, in Martin v. Credit Protection Association 44 the court invali-
dated a postemployment noncompetition covenant contained in Martin's
employment contract. 145 The restrictive covenant prevented Martin from
selling, soliciting, or contacting customers of the collection agency for a
three-year period. Martin served first as a marketing director and soon ad-
vanced to the position of vice-president of the company. The supreme court
held salesmen to be a common calling occupation, despite Martin's elevated
position in the business.146
Applying the Hill criteria, the court found that the employer had no trade
secrets, although the company's significant interest in its customer informa-
tion warranted reasonable limitations. 147 The court summarily dismissed
this justification, however, on the basis that customer information did not
constitute special training or knowledge, thus strongly suggesting that there
was no valuable consideration to support the noncompetition covenant. 148
141. See Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626, 626 (July 13, 1988),
withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (postemployment covenant not to compete in the em-
ployment contract of a vice-president unenforceable); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 31 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 616, 617 (July 13, 1988), withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (covenant not to
compete included in office manager's employment contract unenforceable).
142. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 171.
143. Id. at 172.
144. 793 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. 1990).
145. Id. at 668. Martin, a salesman and also a vice-president for a credit protection collec-
tion agency, signed a noncompetition agreement in which he agreed not to sell, solicit, or
contact customers of the business for three years following termination of his employment.
Martin subsequently left the company and within a few days time, he started his own collec-
tion agency. As a result of his solicitation of the agency's customers, the former employer
sought to enjoin Martin's competitive activities.
146. See Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626, 626 (July 13, 1988).
147. Id.
148. Id. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the lower courts' holdings and indicated




The Martin court further limited the scope of permissible noncompetition
covenants by declaring that covenants not to compete were only enforceable
in two instances: "(1) covenants incident to the sale of a business; and (2)
postemployment covenants to prevent utilizing special training or
knowledge.' 149
On the same day that the court decided the Martin opinion, the Supreme
Court of Texas handed down another important decision, DeSantis v. Wack-
enhut Corp., 15 in which the court declared a noncompetition covenant con-
tained in the employment contract of a security company executive
unenforceable.' 5' A discussion of the salient facts in the DeSantis case is
critical to an understanding of the court's complicated analysis. Edward
DeSantis spent his career in the security business, both in the CIA and in the
private sector. In 1981, George Wackenhut, the founder, president, and
largest shareholder of Wackenhut Corporation, a company specializing in
providing security guard services to various businesses, offered DeSantis a
position as area manager of the corporation's regional Houston office.' 52
Upon DeSantis's acceptance, he signed a noncompetition covenant that in-
cluded an agreement that Florida law would govern any disputes concerning
interpretation or enforcement of the covenant. Significantly, Florida statu-
tory law generally approves the enforcement of postemployment noncompe-
tition covenants.' 5 3 The noncompetition covenant precluded DeSantis from
engaging in any postemployment competition with Wackenhut in a forty-
county area surrounding Houston for a two-year period.
After three years with the company, DeSantis resigned and started a new
company, Risk Deterrence, Inc. (RDI), to provide security consulting and
security guard services to a limited number of clients. DeSantis contacted
approximately twenty or thirty companies, half of which were Wackenhut
customers. Consequently, DeSantis obtained two of these customers as his
own clients.' 54 After learning of these contracts, Wackenhut brought suit
against DeSantis and RDI for injunctive relief, monetary damages for
breach of the noncompetition covenant, and tortious interference with con-
tract and business relations.' 55
149. Id.
150. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616, 617 (July 13, 1988), withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
151. Id.
152. Wackenhut Corporation, the third largest security service company in the industry,
had a policy of requiring all company employees, including senior executives, to sign noncom-
petition covenants.
153. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 680; see Fla. Stat. § 542.33 (1990). Moreover, injunctive
relief may be more readily attainable in Florida since Florida courts presume irreparable harm
to the employer when the past employee engages in competitive activities. By way of compari-
son, Texas applies a rigorous standard for parties seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant
through a temporary injunction, placing the burden on the employer to establish a probable
right to prevail on the merits, and probable irreparable injury in the interim. See Sun Oil Co.
v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968).
154. Two of Wackenhut's customers, Marathon Oil Company and TRW Mission Drilling
Products, apparently dissatisfied with Wackenhut's services, entered into security services con-
tracts with DeSantis' newly formed company, RDI.
155. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 676. DeSantis and RDI counterclaimed for fraud, tortious
interference with contract, and for money damages for wrongful issuance of a temporary in-
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Subsequent to a jury trial, the court reformed the noncompetition cove-
nant to cover only thirteen counties and enjoined DeSantis from competing
with Wackenhut for a two-year period.' 56 Once modified to a reasonable
territorial limitation, the trial court enforced the covenant, and the court of
appeals affirmed.157 The Texas Supreme Court refused to apply Florida law
to the covenant, holding that Florida law was inconsistent with the funda-
mental Texas public policy of promoting free mobility of its employees in the
job market.15
The court initially determined that the former employee was not engaged
in a common calling, given the extent of his responsibilities as an area man-
ager,' 59 but also held that the covenant failed to withstand scrutiny under
the Hill four-part standard.160 First, the supreme court concluded that the
noncompetition covenant was not necessary to protect the employer.' 61
While an employer's legitimate business interests in protecting business
goodwill or trade secrets typically satisfy this prong, the court determined
that Wackenhut lacked a legitimate business interest.' 62 With regard to the
consideration requirement of Hill, the DeSantis court concluded that there
was no consideration to support the covenant since DeSantis did not obtain
any special knowledge or training from Wackenhut. 63 The court also relied
on the fact that DeSantis had acquired fourteen years of experience in the
security business prior to signing on with Wackenhut.164 Consequently, the
court held that the covenant was unreasonable and vacated the prior issu-
ance of an injunction. 165
junction, and other violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. Id. (citing TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.01 (Vernon Supp. 1991)).
156. Id. at 676. The trial court also prohibited DeSantis from disclosing client lists or
divulging confidential business information. Id. With regard to RDI, the trial court perma-
nently enjoined this company from disclosing or using any confidential or proprietary informa-
tion acquired through DeSantis's efforts during his employ at Wackenhut. Furthermore, the
court enjoined RDI from employing DeSantis for a two-year period in any capacity or for any
competitive activities in the thirteen counties. All of the counterclaims brought by DeSantis
and RDI were ultimately denied. Id.
157. Id. at 677.
158. Id. at 679-80. In fact, the court noted that the law governing enforcement of postem-
ployment noncompetition covenants tracked fundamental Texas policy. Specifically, the court
observed that "the freedom to move from one job to another ... benefits both the state and the
individual." Id. (citing Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 171). Therefore, Texas law governs the enforce-
ability determination since Texas has a materially greater interest than Florida 'does in deter-
mining the enforceability of the covenant. Id. at 679. The court reasoned that "[a]t stake here
is whether a Texas resident can leave one Texas job to start a competing Texas business." Id.
159. DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 620. As office manager in the Houston office, Wack-
enhut held DeSantis responsible for handling gross revenues in the millions of dollars. Addi-
tionally, DeSantis headed all operations, contracts, proposals, and client development for the
Houston office. Id.
160. Id.
161. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684. Specifically, the court held that the jury's failure to find
that Desantis was able to appropriate any business goodwill was tantamount to a failure to find
that the covenant was necessary to protect Wackenhut. Id. at 683.
162. Id. at 684.
163. DeSantis, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 620 (citing Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725
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C. The Legislative Amendments: Texas Business and Commerce Code
Sections 15.50 and 15.51
In 1989 while the DeSantis case was pending before the Texas Supreme
Court for the second time, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 946.166
Consequently, the legislature amended Chapter 15 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code, adding sections 15.50 and 15.51, which address covenants
not to compete. 167 The purpose of the new legislation is three-fold in that
the sections: (1) codify the criteria for enforceability of covenants not to
compete; (2) provide evidentiary standards for the enforceability of cove-
nants not to compete; and (3) mandate judicial reformation of otherwise en-
forceable covenants that are unreasonable in terms of the scope of activity to
be restrained or the geographical limitations imposed. 168 The legislature ex-
pressly made this amendment applicable to a covenant entered into before,
on, or after the effective date of this Act.' 69 Thus, the statute certainly gov-
erns covenants not to compete entered into after August 28, 1989, the effec-
tive date of the legislation.170
According to sections 15.50 and 15.51, a covenant not to compete will be
enforceable when the following four questions are answered in the
affirmative.
1. Is the covenant not to compete ancillary to an otherwise enforceable
agreement?171
2. Will the covenant not to compete be executed on a date other than
the date on which the underlying agreement is executed? 172
If so, is the covenant not to compete supported by independent valua-
ble consideration? 173
166. Senate Bill 946 amends the Texas Business and Commerce Code by adding Sub-
chapter E (§§ 15.50.-51) which addresses covenants not to compete.
167. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-.51 (Vernon Supp. 1991). Sections
15.50-.51 appear in a subchapter of the Texas and Business Commerce Code entitled "Cove-
nants Not to Compete." These sections set forth criteria which unquestionably govern the
enforceability of covenants not to compete entered into after August 28, 1989, the effective
date of the legislation. See Gray, supra note 64, at 585, 586 n.2.
Section § 15.50(1) of the Act entitled, "Criteria for Enforceability of Covenants not to Com-
pete," provides that:
a covenant not to compete is enforceable to the extent that it: (1) is ancillary to
an otherwise enforceable agreement but if the covenant not to compete is exe-
cuted on a date other than the date on which the underlying agreement is exe-
cuted, such covenant must be supported by independent valuable consideration;
and (2) contains reasonable limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope
of activity to be restrained that do not impose a greater restraint than is neces-
sary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.
TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
168. Gray, supra note 64.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 586 n.2.
171. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
172. Id.
173. One commentator and chairperson of the ad hoc committee of the Business Law Sec-
tion that drafted the legislation, maintains that the drafters intended the statutory language
requiring independent valuable consideration "to apply to a covenant not to compete that is
obtained by an employer subsequent to the execution of an employment agreement" and there-
fore, effectively eliminate continued employment as sufficient consideration for such covenants.
COMMENT
If not, go to criterion 3.
3. Does the covenant not to compete incorporate reasonable limitations
as to time, geographical area, and the scope of activity restrained?1 74
4. Do such reasonable limitations impose the minimal restraint neces-
sary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
beneficiary/promisee?75
D. A Second Look at DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp. by the Supreme
Court of Texas
Presumably in contemplation of the legislation's proposed intent to statu-
torily abolish the common calling standard and to reinstate judicial reforma-
tion of unreasonable covenants, the Supreme Court of Texas granted
motions for rehearing in DeSantis on June 6, 1990.176 With Justice Hecht
writing for the majority, the court withdrew the prior DeSantis opinion and
judgment 177 and substituted a new opinion 78. Once again, the court held
that Texas law governed the enforceability question and that the noncompe-
tition covenant was therefore unenforceable.1 79
The DeSantis court held that the covenant in question was unreasonable,
and thus unenforceable, based on its analysis of three common law
criteria. ' 80 First, the covenant not to compete was indisputably ancillary to
Wackenhut's employment of DeSantis, which the court deemed an other-
wise valid relationship. '8' Second, the business goodwill arguably developed
by DeSantis for Wackenhut failed to constitute a legitimate interest warrant-
ing protection by the enforcement of a covenant not to compete. 8 2 The
Gray, supra note 64. A literal reading of the statute as written, however, requires that there be
independent valuable consideration (1) whether the covenant not to compete is executed before
or after the underlying agreement, or (2) whether the underlying agreement is an employment
agreement or another type of agreement. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1991).
174. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
175. Id.
176. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 674 (Tex. 1990).
177. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 616, 617 (July 13, 1988).
178. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990), withdrawing, 31 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 616 (July 13, 1988).
179. Id. at 684. The court used the rule of limited party autonomy formulated in RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) to determine what law should
govern the contract; it held that the enforceability of the covenant not to compete "must be
judged by Texas law," not by Florida law as chosen by the parties. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at
677-81.
180. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684.
181. Id. at 683. The court specifically identified the legal dispute in the case to be "whether
the agreement was necessary to protect some legitimate interest of Wackenhut, and whether
that necessity was outweighed by the hardship of enforcement." Id.
182. Id. In fact, the DeSantis court stated that "[t]he evidence that DeSantis ever devel-
oped business goodwill for Wackenhut.... (was] exceedingly slight.., little more than testi-
mony that DeSantis occasionally entertained representatives of Wackenhut's clients." Id.
Even assuming the existence of goodwill, the DeSantis court reasoned that "there [was] no
showing that [DeSantis] did or even could divert that goodwill to himself for his own benefit
after leaving Wackenhut." Id. But see Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex.
1983), where the Texas Supreme Court held that protection of client rapport was a legitimate
interest to protect. Id. In that case, the court held that the original owner of a business in a
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court pointed out that dissatisfaction with Wackenhut's services, not good-
will developed by DeSantis during his employ with Wackenhut, prompted
one customer to move its business from Wackenhut to DeSantis. 18 3 Third,
the court emphatically held that Wackenhut "failed to show that it needed
such protection in this case." 184 For these reasons, the hardship of the re-
straint on DeSantis's right to compete outweighed any need to protect a
legitimate business interest of Wackenhut.18
The DeSantis court carefully avoided application of the recent legislation
although it specifically held that the noncompetition covenant at issue was
no more enforceable under the new amendments than under established
common law principles.' 8 6 The court expressly declined to consider the ef-
fect of the new sections 15.50 and 15.51 on covenants not to compete entered
into prior to the effective date of the Act, instead leaving the resolution of
those issues for another day.' 8 7 Additionally, the court did not address how
the recent legislation altered the common law principles governing cove-
nants not to compete.188
In holding the covenant unenforceable, the DeSantis court embraced a
reasonableness analysis rather than applying either the four-part Hill test or
the common calling standard.18 9 The supreme court restated its adherence
to long-standing fundamental principles governing the enforceability of non-
competition covenants in Texas. 190 The DeSantis court discussed the state
of confusion created by the common calling standard, emphasizing its own
failure either to define the term or to elaborate on the purpose of the stan-
two-member partnership had a right to protect himself from the possibility that Kroenecke,
the other partner, would establish rapport with the clients and upon termination, take the
clients' business with him. Id. The court's holding, however, may be limited to the specific
facts in that case and the special nature of a two-member partnership.
183. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 683.
184. Id. at 684. The DeSantis court rejected Wackenhut's contention that DeSantis ac-
quired some confidential information while with Wackenhut that necessitated protection by a
covenant not to compete. Id. Although the court held that "confidential information [such as
customers' identities, special needs and requirements, and beneficiary's pricing policies, cost
factors and bidding strategies] may be protected by an agreement not to compete," the court
argued that Wackenhut failed to meet his burden. Id. Specifically, the court asserted that:
Wackenhut failed to show-that its customers could not readily be identified by
someone outside its employ, that such knowledge carried some competitive ad-
vantage, . . . [and] that its pricing policies and bidding strategies were uniquely
developed, or that information about its prices and bids could not.., be ob-
tained from the customers themselves.
Id. Furthermore, there was no evidence that DeSantis took advantage of any knowledge he
had of Wackenhut to try and outbid them or woo away any customers. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 685. The court asserted that "[t]he agreement not to compete in this case is no
more enforceable under sections 15.50 and 15.51 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code
than it would be under the above-stated common law principles governing such agreements."
Id.
187. Id. at 685. The legislation purported to apply to the agreement at issue in the DeSan-
tis case since it expressly "applies to a covenant entered into before, on, or after the effective
date of this Act." Id. at 684 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 historical note
(Act effective Aug. 28, 1989)).
188. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685.
189. Id. at 681-83.
190. See supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
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dard.191 The court stated that in determining whether an ancillary noncom-
petition covenant is reasonable, the "primary focus of inquiry" should be on
the need to protect a legitimate interest of the promisee balanced against the
burden of such protection on the promisor and the public. ' 92 In so holding,
the court appeared to preserve the balancing test first announced in
Weatherford. 193
Since the district court ruling in Wabash Life Insurance Co. v. Garner,194
the Texas Supreme Court has noted that section 15.50 may alter the applica-
tion of the common calling test to determine the validity of covenants not to
compete.195 More recently, the DeSantis court may have signaled a sharp
departure from the common calling standard in deciding the facts presented
in that case. Although the court there did not explicitly reject the standard,
the majority justified its own refusal to apply the common calling test in two
ways. 196
First, the court asserted that it would have held the covenants not to com-
pete unenforceable in both seminal common calling cases, 197 whether or not
the respective promisors engaged in common callings.198 Second, the court
argued that by excluding the test as a criterion, the Texas Legislature effec-
tively abolished the common calling standard as a viable tool for determin-
ing the reasonableness of noncompetition covenants. 199 The DeSantis court
ultimately found that Wackenhut, as an employer, had failed to establish a
legitimate business interest worthy of protection through the enforcement of
a noncompetition covenant. 200
191. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682-83.
192. Id. at 683.
193. Id. at 682. In fact, the court specifically noted that "[b]efore an agreement not to
compete will be enforced, its benefits must be balanced against its burdens, both to the prom-
isor and the public." Id.
194. 732 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
195. Id. at 693-94. While the Wabash court did acknowledge that the new statute would
alter the common law analysis of noncompetition covenants, it nonetheless maintained that the
new statute effectively codified the previous case law formulation for determining the enforce-
ability of covenants not to compete. Id. at 693. Noting that courts faced with deciding en-
forceability issues would still have to balance the interests of the employer and the employee,
the court stated that "[t]he complicated and fact-intensive aspects of each individual business
relationship [could] not fairly be evaluated without an examination of each party's particular
needs and interests." Id. at 694 (citing NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 757 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th
Cir. 1985); Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 S.W.2d 8, 11
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)).
196. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 683.
197. Id. In this regard, the court referred to Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d
168 (Tex. 1987), and Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987).
198. DeSants, 793 S.W.2d at 683.
199. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-.51 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
200. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 683. The court concluded that the meager evidence of busi-
ness goodwill allegedly developed by DeSantis during his employ was insufficient to conclude
that any goodwill ever existed. Furthermore, the court found that there was no evidence indi-
cating that DeSantis was able to utilize, for his own interests, any goodwill he might have
developed for Wackenhut. Id. The court also argued that Wackenhut failed to establish that
its alleged confidential information in connection with the company was sufficiently protect-
able so as to warrant the issuance of an injunction. Id. at 684.
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V. ANALYSIS: A DEPARTURE FROM THE COMMON CALLING
STANDARD AND A RETURN TO REFORMATION OF
UNREASONABLE COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. Elimination of the Common Calling Standard
The most recent DeSantis opinion raises serious questions as to whether
the majority meant to reject the common calling standard previously applied
by Texas courts in determining the enforceability of noncompetition cove-
nants. The court identified the following three interests as the chief consid-
erations in determining the reasonableness of an ancillary covenant not to
compete: (1) the necessity to protect the promisee's legitimate interest; (2)
the hardship of such protection on the promisor; and (3) the hardship to the
public. 20 1 The Texas Supreme Court suggested that the common calling
standard may have limited future application in evaluating the enforceability
of covenants not to compete.202 The court cautioned that although the ques-
tion of whether the nature of an individual's job fell within the common
calling classification could sometimes be a consideration in the reasonable-
ness inquiry, the common calling test was not a crucial component in the
determination of a covenant's enforceability. 20 3
After making this sweeping statement, apparently in direct conflict with
Hill, the majority boldly declared that the common calling standard did not
form the basis for its holding in DeSantis, choosing to rely instead on the
common law principles governing restrictive covenants. 2°4 Despite the
court's express departure from the Hill test, it did not overrule the Hill deci-
sion.205 The court buttressed its departure from the common calling test by
recalling several recent decisions adjudicating the enforceability of noncom-
petition covenants where the courts declined to apply the common calling
standard in determining that the covenants were unenforceable.20 6 Perhaps
a fair way to reconcile the majority and concurring opinions of the DeSantis
holding with regard to the common calling test is by reading DeSantis as
rejecting the common calling test as the sole analysis for the enforceability of
covenants not to compete.
201. Id. at 681-82.
202. Id. at 682.
203. Id. at 683.
204. Id.
205. In fact, Justice Mauzy's first comment in his concurring opinion was that "(tihe court
takes great pains to avoid overruling Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., and Bergman v. Norris
... by even discussing these cases, the Court reaches too far." DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 689
(citations omitted).
206. Id. at 682-83 (citing Posey v. Monier Resources, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied); French v. Community Broadcasting, 766 S.W.2d 330,
333 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (noncompetition covenant enforcea-
ble since purpose was to prevent employee's utilization of special knowledge); Bland v. Henry
& Peters, P.C., 763 S.W.2d 5, 7-8 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied) (covenant held unen-
forceable where employee received no special training or knowledge from former employer).
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B. The Concurring Opinion in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp- Common
Calling Standard Has Continued Vitality
As to the resolution of the future applicability of the common calling stan-
dard, the concurring opinion, written by Justice Mauzy, and the majority
opinion reveal other inconsistencies. Justice Mauzy, joined by Justice
Spears, argued that the common calling doctrine has continued vitality and
force in the context of noncompetition covenants. 20 7 To this end, Justice
Mauzy vigorously disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the legisla-
ture rejected the common calling test in amending the Texas Business and
Commerce Code. 208 To the contrary, the concurrence reasoned that the
scope of activity language contained in section 15.50 could be broadly con-
strued to permit application of the common calling standard. 2°9
Justice Mauzy viewed the majority's discussion of the common calling
standard as misplaced since the noncompetition covenant in question was
unenforceable without regard to whether it restricted the right to engage in a
common calling.210 The concurrence implied that the majority went too far
in analyzing the enforceability issue since the common law principles gov-
erning covenants not to compete would have effectively operated to invali-
date the noncompetition covenant in question without the necessity of
resorting to the common calling standard.21' Justice Mauzy concluded his
concurring opinion by first arguing that Texas courts have formulated pre-
cise definitions of the common calling notion despite the supreme court's
failure to specifically define the standard. 21 2 Second, Justice Mauzy ex-
pressed his approval for the continued application of the common calling
standard on a case-by-case basis.213
C. Policy Reasons for and Against the Retention of the
Common Calling Standard
The Intellectual Property Law section of the State Bar of Texas endorsed
the recent legislative amendments to the Texas Business and Commerce
Code sections 15.50 and 15.51, which proposed to abolish the common call-
ing test of Hill.214 Reasons typically advanced in support of abolishing the
standard include the uncertainty and vagueness in applying the test,215 the
207. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 689-90 (Mauzy, J., concurring).
208. Id.
209. Id. For a review of the language expressed in § 15.50 of the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code, see supra note 167 and accompanying text.
210. Id. at 689-90. In fact, Justice Mauzy stated that the court's reference to the common
calling standard was "unnecessary, gratuitous, and ill-advised," and asked, "Is this not the
very definition of judicial activism?" Id. at 689.
211. Id.
212. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 689 (citing Ray & McKelvey, Drafting Enforceable Noncom-
petition Agreements in Texas, 20 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 63, 68 (1989); White, Common Callings
and the Enforcement of Postemployment Covenants in Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589, 611
(1988)).
213. Id. at 690. Justice Mauzy stated, "I am content to allow the common calling concept
to be worked out on a case-by-case basis." Id.




expense incurred by private litigants to determine whether a particular occu-
pation falls within the ambiguous meaning,216 and the confusion created by
the adoption of the standard with regard to courts' ability to reform unrea-
sonable noncompetition covenants. 217 Significantly, since 1987 when the
supreme court adopted the common calling standard in Hill, the court re-
fused to reform any of the covenants found to be unreasonable, instead
choosing to declare such covenants unenforceable. 218 The mandate of the
new amendments unequivocally states that courts shall reform covenants
with unreasonable restrictions to impose only reasonable restraints upon the
promisor. 219 Thus, the impact of the DeSantis opinion and the recent
amendments to the Texas Business and Commerce Code on the application
of the common calling standard is uncertain. The DeSantis decision does
make clear, however, that the common calling standard is unnecessary in
situations where established common law principles render such covenants
unenforceable. 220
As a justification for retention of the common calling standard, one com-
mentator urges that the common calling doctrine makes intuitive sense in
the restrictive covenant context since courts should enforce such agreements
only in situations where the employer is neither engaging in opportunistic
behavior or exercising monopoly power, nor imposing significant negative
social costs by restricting competition.22' At best, the common calling stan-
dard serves as a filtering mechanism through which courts can establish a
threshold standard by refusing to enforce those covenants restraining the
right of individuals in common callings to pursue similar work after termina-
tion of their employment. Accordingly, courts are less burdened by needless
litigation if the common calling standard is accepted, since employers will
likely not seek to enforce covenants restraining competition in common call-
ing occupations. The idea is that employees engaged in common occupa-
tions, such as salesmen and hairstylists, who compete with their employers
after termination, do not present a great threat of harm to the employer even
if they change jobs. Arguably, a business can replace a salesman position
more readily from the marketplace than it could a petroleum engineer or
highly skilled computer analyst position.
A different justification for the continued labeling of certain occupations
as common callings is that common callings generally involve skills that are
widely available to the public; this justification suggests that the public will
be harmed if courts enforce covenants restraining competitive activity of in-
dividuals engaged in these common occupations. 222 In fact, one commenta-
216. Id.
217. Id.; see DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 683.
218. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685; Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667,
670 (Tex. 1990); Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. 1987).
219. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
220. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 683.
221. See White, supra note 212, at 611 (citing Blake, supra note 3, at 684-85 (economic
societal loss great when employee is restrained from using special abilities elsewhere)).
222. See generally id. (discussing some advantages and disadvantages from continued ap-
plication of common calling standard).
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tor urges that in deciding what skills constitute common callings, courts
should focus on the degree to which a particular type of employee is repre-
sented in the workplace.223 If the occupation tends to be represented in the
labor market to a significant extent so that the employee is fungible from the
employer's perspective, that occupation is presumably a common calling.
224
Such an approach will undoubtedly require courts to employ a case-by-case
approach, focusing on the individual facts and circumstances associated with
a given profession. In fact, this approach is not inconsistent with Justice
Mauzy's view in DeSantis, that deciding the applicability of the common
calling standard on a case-by-case method is appropriate.
225
Another commentator argued that courts should enforce noncompetition
covenants only where the employer expends considerable time, effort, or
money in imparting techniques or knowledge to the employee. 226 In such
situations, the employee will likely have specialized skills or knowledge that
may be irreplaceable to the employer, providing the employer a stronger
argument that his business will be harmed if the court does not enforce a
noncompetition covenant to protect his interest.227 Moreover, an employee
with specialized and unique skills is arguably not engaged in a common
calling.228
Common callings should not be abolished by Texas courts. While the
somewhat vague standard admittedly creates some confusion in determining
whether a given occupation fits within the common calling regime, ordinary
trades and occupations should not be subject to the restraints on fair compe-
tition that covenants not to compete impose. Although there is no clear
definition of the standard, the concurring justice in DeSantis argued that
courts had in fact developed reasonably precise formulations for the stan-
dard.229 Additionally, continued application of the common calling stan-
dard will effectively prevent the potential abuse of low-level employees by
their employers. Retention of the common calling test will force employers
to scrutinize the noncompetition covenants more carefully and to seek en-
forcement only of those covenants that genuinely harm his or her legitimate
business interests. Thus, lower courts may interpret the DeSantis opinion to
allow application of the common calling standard on a case-by-case method
as Justice Mauzy suggested in his concurrence. 230
223. Id. at 612.
224. Id.
225. DeSanis, 793 S.W.2d at 690.
226. See Blake, supra note 3, at 684-85.
227. Id. at 661.
228. See Gray, supra note 64, at 586.
229. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 690. In Justice Mauzy's endorsement of the common calling
standard, he specifically noted that "it is the genius of the common law that it evolves slowly in
the light of reason and experience." Id.
230. In fact, the majority in DeSantis even concedes that "[t]he nature of the promisor's job
- whether it is a common calling - may sometimes factor into the determination of reasona-
bleness .... Id. at 683. Although the majority then states than the common calling test will
not be the primary focus of inquiry in suits about covenants not to compete, the majority's
admission that the standard may conceivably still apply, coupled with Justice Mauzy's ostensi-
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D. No Explicit Rejection of the Common Calling Standard
by the Texas Legislature
Although the majority acknowledged that one of the legislative purposes
of section 15.50 was to extinguish the common calling standard, the court
chose not to explicitly reject the standard.231 Whether the legislative amend-
ments will accomplish the objective of removing the common calling stan-
dard from the reasonableness inquiry is questionable. Absent an explicit
rejection by the Texas Supreme Court, lower courts are likely to apply the
common calling standard depending on the individual facts and circum-
stances of each noncompetition covenant case.
To support the continued application of the common calling standard, the
lower courts will undoubtedly argue that the legislature should have drafted
the amendments more clearly if they in fact intended to eliminate the com-
mon calling standard in the reasonableness inquiry. The legislature was
merely silent on the issue of common callings in the area of noncompetition
covenants. Arguably, such silence should not be equated with the legisla-
ture's intent to abolish the common calling standard. Absent an express
rejection of the common calling standard by the new statutes, the lower
courts will possibly have some latitude in applying the standard to refuse
enforcement of certain noncompetition covenants, particularly if the facts
indicate that an employer is abusing the employee's freedom of movement in
the marketplace when that employee is engaged in a common and non-
specialized occupation. Since the courts' continued analysis of the common
calling standard in the area of covenants not to compete will undoubtedly
run counter to the legislature's intent, the legislature may have to resort to
another amendment or express clarification of the present legislation's effect.
E. A Return to Judicial Reformation of Broad Covenants
Not to Compete in Texas
In adjudicating the enforceability of covenants not to compete, courts will
generally refuse to enforce covenants if the specific competitive activity the
employee engages in is reasonable.232 In balancing the competing interests
of the employer and employee, however, the court may find that the em-
ployer has a legitimate business interest to protect but that the restraints
incorporated in the covenant are unreasonable in scope. If so, the courts
may reform the covenant to impose reasonable limitations concerning time,
geographical area, and scope of activity. An appellate court sitting as a
court of equity, based on the grant of an injunction, has broad powers to
ble approval of the standard, appears to leave adequate room for courts to apply the standard
in appropriate factual situations. Id. at 683, 690.
231. DeSantis v. Wackenhut, 793 S.W.2d 670, 683 (Tex. 1990). Despite the court's sugges-
tion that the common calling test may apply in the appropriate situation, the court emphati-
cally refused to apply the common calling test to the covenant at issue, reasoning that common
law principles decided the enforceability question. Id.
232. See Blake, supra note 3, at 674.
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modify a covenant in order to render it reasonable. 233 On the other hand, if
the court simply sat as a court of law, then it would only be authorized to
award damages and could not modify the covenant. 234 Thus, the perceived
goal of a valid noncompetition covenant may be to strike an even balance
between the burden on the employee and the protection to the employer
warranted by his legitimate business interests. Whether reformation of non-
competition covenants achieves this ideal is highly debatable. 235
The Texas legislature's recent addition of section 15.51(c) to the Texas
Business and Commerce Code provides that courts shall reform covenants
failing to meet the reasonableness requirements of section 15.50(2) when
those covenants are otherwise ancillary to an underlying agreement or sup-
ported by independent valuable consideration. 236 Although the concept of
judicial reformation of unreasonable noncompetition covenants is not new to
Texas courts,237 recent supreme court decisions appear to be moving away
from the notion that the courts will redraft reasonable terms in situations
where the employer did not.238 This recent legislation unquestionably sig-
nals a return to reformation, provided that an employer can meet the thresh-
old showing that he or she has a legitimate business interest entitled to
protection through enforcement of a noncompetition covenant. 239 Once the
employer satisfies this requirement, the court will pare down overly broad
time, territorial, and scope of activity limitations so that they reasonably
protect the employer's interest. The Texas Supreme Court made clear in
DeSantis, however, that the employer must establish his protectable interest
before courts will proceed to invoke section 15.51(c) in order to reform the
noncompetition covenant. 24°
A covenant not to compete with indefinite duration and geographical
scope limitations is unenforceable as a matter of law.24' Under section
233. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682; Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310,
340 S.W.2d 950, 952-53 (1960).
234. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1991). Section 15.51 directly tracks the common law in this area allowing for reforma-
tion of covenants not to compete. Id
235. See generally 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1390, 1394 (1951); 5 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 17, at §§ 1659-1660 (rev. ed. 1981). Section 518 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS limits severability to restraints that are divisible in terms. Professors Williston
and Corbin, along with most American courts, do not follow the Restatement and freely re-
form restraints that are indivisible in terms.
236. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50(l)-(2), 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
237. See Lewis v. Krueger Hutchinson & Overton Clinic, 153 Tex. 363, 366, 269 S.W.2d
798, 799 (1954).
238. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990); Martin v. Credit
Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990); Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d
673, 674 (Tex. 1987).
239. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
240. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685. In fact, the court unequivocally states "that [since]
Wackenhut has failed to make this required showing [to establish a protectable business inter-
est], we cannot reform the agreement to meet either the criteria of section 15.50(2), or of
Weatherford for that matter." Id. at 685.
241. See Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 952 (1960).
The court determined an unlimited area restraint to be unreasonable since the restraints must
bear some relation to the interest being protected. Id. at 952. Thus, the court found it unneces-
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15.51(c), a court applying equity is now required to rewrite the unreasonable
covenant and enforce it as modified.242 In contrast, if the suit is for dam-
ages, then the covenant must stand or fall as written.243 Courts may rewrite
covenants only when a party seeks an injunction.244 Moreover, courts en-
force duration and geographic scope limitations only to the extent necessary
to protect the promisee's legitimate interest. 245
Beginning with the Hill decision, Texas courts began to evolve a trend
toward not reforming unreasonable restraints in noncompetition covenants.
The Hill court noted that in the past the Texas Supreme Court had modified
restrictive covenants in order to make the time, area, and scope limitations
incorporated by the covenant reasonable. 246 However, despite the courts'
previous reformation practice, the Hill court carefully explained that a pre-
sumption favoring the validity of the covenant had never existed in Texas
law simply because the area and time restrictions imposed were not overly
broad. 24 7
In Hill Justice Gonzalez wrote a vigorous dissent in which he argued
against the majority's refusal to modify the covenant in question.24
Although Justice Gonzalez agreed with the majority that a seven-county
area restraint was unreasonable, he argued that reforming the restraint to a
two-county area, along with prohibiting Hill from contacting any managers
in the seven-county area he once serviced, was the proper approach.249 Jus-
tice Gonzalez expressed shock at the court's repudiation of well established
Texas precedent as indicated by the court's unwillingness to reform the cove-
nant to impose reasonable limitations. 250
Oddly enough, Justice Gonzalez correctly speculated that the supreme
court's refusal to reform the covenant suggested that courts would no longer
modify unreasonable covenants.251 In dissent, Justice Gonzalez cited a line
sary for the protection of the employer's business to restrain the employee in an area where his
former work had not taken him. Id.
242. Weatherford, 340 S.W.2d at 952. This equitable modification is available for over-
broad time and geographic scope limitations. The Texas Supreme Court endorsed this state-
ment in Spinks v. Riebold, 310 S.W.2d 668, 669-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1958, writ ref'd).
The court of appeals explained that its duty was to determine the extent of enforceability,
rather than to determine the validity of the contract in its entirety. In Spinks the court re-
formed both the duration and area restraints imposed by the covenant. Id. See also Justin Belt
Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1973) (unreasonable covenants which are void as to
either duration or geographic scope restraints or both are not beyond reformation in equity).
243. See Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., 793 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. 1990)
(covenant lacking geographical area and scope of activity restraints unenforceable in suit for
damages since covenant must stand or fall as written) (citing Weatherford, 340 S.W.2d at 952-
53).
244. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 682 (Tex. 1990).
245. See Electronic Data Sys. v. Kinder, 497 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1974).
246. See Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987); Matlock v. Data
Processing Sec., Inc., 618 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. 1981); Justin Belt, 502 S.W.2d at 684; Spinks,
310 S.W.2d at 669.
247. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 172.
248. Id. at 175.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 175. Justice Gonzalez noted that the supreme court's refusal to reform the
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of Texas cases following the long-standing practice adhered to by Texas
courts reforming covenants not to compete and enforcing those covenants to
impose only reasonable restraints.252 In closing, Justice Gonzales asserted
that Texas courts should continue to follow this practice.253
Subsequent to Hill, the Texas Supreme Court did not even attempt to
apply the reformation doctrine in three separate instances. 254 In Bergman v.
Norris of Houston the court did not embrace a reasonableness analysis con-
cerning the covenant's time and area restrictions, but instead found the non-
competition covenant unenforceable because the four employee hairstylists
were engaged in a common calling.255 Likewise, in Martin v. Credit Protec-
tion Association,25 6 the supreme court initially invalidated the noncompeti-
tion covenant on the basis that a salesman is a common calling
occupation.257 In the wake of the new legislative amendments to the Texas
Business and Commerce Code, however, the supreme court refused to re-
form the covenant and held the noncompetition covenant unenforceable on
the basis of two fundamental common law principles. 25
8
Similarly, the court in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.259 expressly refused
to reform the covenant even though the trial court previously modified the
covenant's forty county limitation to thirteen counties. 260 In support of this
decision, the supreme court emphasized the mandate of section 15.51(b),
which requires that the promisee establish a protectable business interest in
situations when the promisor renders personal services.261 To this end, the
time, geographical area, and scope of activity limitations imposed by the
covenant must not be greater than reasonably necessary to protect this busi-
covenant in Hill "implied ... that such covenants [would] not be modified by the court's
equity powers in the future." Id.
252. See Matlock v. Data Processing Sec., Inc., 618 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. 1981); Justin
Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1973); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161
Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 952 (1960); Dittmer v. Source E D P, Texas, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 877,
881-82 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). The court pointed out that the Restatement
also followed this approach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 comment b
(1981).
253. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 175.
254. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 685 (rex. 1990); Martin v. Credit
Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. 1990); Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734
S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. 1987).
255. Bergman, 734 S.W.2d at 674.
256. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626, 626 (July 13, 1988), withdrawn, 793 S.W.2d 667, (rex. 1990).
257. Id. at 626.
258. See Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 668-670. Unlike the first decision, the supreme court did
not make any reference to the common calling standard in this opinion. In analyzing the
reasonableness of the covenant, the court found that the covenant not to compete was not
ancillary to an employment agreement as a matter of law. Id. at 669. Indisputably, the em-
ployment agreement consisted solely of this covenant not to compete, lacking any of the provi-
sions usually associated with an employment contract, such as job position and compensation.
The court additionally noted that the covenant not to compete was unsupported by independ-
ent valuable consideration, a requirement for covenants executed on a separate date from the
execution date of the underlying agreement. Id. at 670 (citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,
793 S.W.2d 670, 681 (Tex. 1990)).
259. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).




ness interest or goodwill of the promisee. 262 Thus, the court refused to
reform the noncompetition covenant in DeSantis based on the employer's
failure to demonstrate a legitimate business interest worthy of protection. 263
Absent such a showing, the court reasoned that the covenant was equally
unenforceable under section 15.50(2) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code. 2 64
As a result of the new legislation, and assuming the employer successfully
establishes a protectable business interest, lower courts will enforce cove-
nants with narrower restrictions upon the employee's ability to compete
rather than refuse enforcement altogether. Both courts and commentators
have grappled with the question of whether reformation should be applied to
postemployment noncompetition covenants. Judicial reformation of unrea-
sonable noncompetition covenants appears valid in situations where employ-
ers truly have legitimate business interests at stake, such as confidential or
proprietary information or goodwill. In these situations reformation is nec-
essary to pare down overbroad restraints prior to their enforcement.
Despite its recognized utility, the more compelling arguments exist
against judicial reformation of unreasonable noncompetition covenants. Be-
cause employers often require prospective employees to sign covenants not
to compete as a precondition for their employment, the threat of enforce-
ment of these restraints often has a chilling effect upon the employee's free-
dom of mobility in the workplace. 26 5 By reforming broad noncompetition
covenants, courts may be facilitating the potential for employee abuse by
creating disincentives for employers to draft reasonable restraints.266
Although not all employers will automatically draft unreasonable cove-
nants,267 courts should at least consider the adverse consequences that refor-
mation may create on the mobility of employees in pursuing their
occupations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite that fact that "[the] new law was intended to make [covenants not
to compete] more enforceable, " 268 the Texas Legislature has unquestionably
cast some doubt on the general enforceability of noncompetition covenants
by adding sections 15.50 and 15.51 to the Texas Business and Commerce
Code. In keeping with the legislature's intent to statutorily abolish the com-
mon calling standard and to reinstate judicial reformation of unreasonable
262. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
263. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685.
264. Id.
265. See Blake, supra note 3, at 685.
266. One commentator has emphatically supported this argument. See id. at 685 n. 197 ("If
[reformation] is generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous covenants with confi-
dence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts of a particular case are not
unreasonable. This smacks of having one's cake and eating it too.").
267. Id. at 683. Blake notes that the argument improperly assumes all contracts are con-
tracts of adhesion with unequal bargaining power and greater burden to the employee. Id.
268. See Nolan, What the Changes in Noncompete Agreements Actually Mean, Hous.
MAG., Nov. 1980, at 32-33.
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COMMENT
covenants not to compete, Texas courts appear to have no choice but to
follow the new statute. The statute unequivocally mandates that courts shall
reform covenants when the promisee establishes a protectable interest and
when the restraints imposed by the covenant pertaining to time, area, and
scope of activity are unreasonable. 269
The legislature, however, does not explicitly convey a similar intent to
abolish the common calling standard despite its well known intent to do
so. 270 The common calling standard has admittedly engendered uncertainty
since the supreme court has not expressly provided a definition for the stan-
dard.271 Courts are thus left to determine whether a given occupation is a
common calling without the benefit of a uniform meaning for the standard.
Faced with further uncertainty as to the application of the common calling
standard in light of the new legislation, lower courts are likely to continue
applying the standard on a case-by-case approach. In DeSantis, a recent
Texas Supreme Court decision, Justice Mauzy suggested that a precise defi-
nition for the standard would only develop after engaging in a case-by-case
approach. 272
In applying the standard, the courts will draw ample support from the
concurrence of DeSantis, in which the concurring justice openly rejected the
view that the legislature meant to eliminate the common calling standard.
Although the court in DeSantis pointed out that other courts held many of
the covenants unenforceable because the employers were effectively re-
straining the right of an individual to engage in a common occupation, the
DeSantis court persuasively reasoned that the common calling standard was
unnecessary where the courts could have simply invalidated the covenants
under the common law principles.273 Nevertheless, the majority in DeSantis
conceded that the nature of the promisor's job may occasionally factor into
the reasonableness inquiry. 274 While the common calling test may not prove
to be the focal part of courts' future analysis of covenants not to compete,
the DeSantis opinion made clear that adequate room remains for courts to
apply the standard if the facts of a case necessitate such an analysis.
In light of section 15.51(c), judicial reformation will emerge again as a
remedy in the enforcement of noncompetition covenants. Courts will tailor
unreasonable time, geographical area, and scope of activity limitations con-
tained in a noncompetition covenant, provided that the employer first meets
his burden of establishing that he has a legitimate business interest that justi-
269. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
270. See Gray, supra note 64, at 586 ("Senate Bill 946 also eliminated the 'common calling'
limitation ... acknowledged in DeSantis").
271. See generally DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 682 (Tex. 1990) ("The
references to 'common calling' in Hill and Bergman have proven confusing in determining
whether to enforce agreements not to compete"). The uncertainty created by the court's fail-
ure to define common calling as well as the legislature's failure to expressly reject the standard,
assuming such was the intent, will likely continue to plague practitioners and breed much
litigation on the subject.
272. Id. at 690.
273. IM. at 682-83.
274. Id. at 683.
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fies the issuance of an injunction enforcing the narrower terms. The possible
adverse consequences of judicial reformation are evident. Employers, with
the knowledge that courts will reform unreasonable covenants, may lose any
incentive they arguably had prior to the amendment, to draft covenants with
reasonable restraints. Such a situation will inevitably impair the mobility of
employees in the workforce. Furthermore, such a result is at odds with the
public policy in Texas favoring an employee's freedom of movement from
one job to another.
Noncompetition covenants will continue to be governed by several funda-
mental principles. First, a covenant not to compete must be ancillary to an
otherwise enforceable agreement, such as an employment contract or a con-
tract for the sale of a business. If the parties execute the covenant not to
compete on a different date than the original transaction, courts will require
independent valuable consideration to support the covenant. Special train-
ing or knowledge imparted to the promisor by the promisee may be one form
of supportive consideration, though not the only permissible consideration.
The covenant must also contain only those reasonable time, geographical
area, and scope of activity limitations reasonably necessary to protect the
legitimate business interests of the employer. In enforcing such a covenant,
courts should tailor the restraints in such a way that while the court protects
the employer's interests, the burden to the employee in enforcing the cove-
nant is minimal. Finally, the employer's interest in enforcing the covenant
must not be outweighed by the burden on the employee or the possible harm
to the public. The majority in DeSantis argues that covenants will effectively
be adjudicated under these principles alone.
With regard to the common calling standard, the legislature should ex-
pressly clarify the intended effect of the statute upon the test to avoid further
confusion over the purpose of the amendments. If the legislature chooses
not to elaborate on this issue, courts will be in the awkward position of try-
ing to second-guess the legislature when an employer tries to enforce a cove-
nant that appears to fit within the common calling regime. Absent an
explicit legislative rejection of the standard, courts in Texas may continue to
utilize the common calling test depending on the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of cases.
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